Daily Report

East Europe

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Balkans: Germany Threatens Muslims, Croats With Sanctions

LD2504152196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1507 GMT 25 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, April 25 (TANJUG)—German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel threatened Moslems and Croats with sanctions here on Thursday if they continued to hamper efforts to bolster their federation in Bosnia.

Opening talks between ranking Moslem and Croat officials held at his request, Kinkel warned them that a party that resisted headway to this end could neither count on the international community's patience nor on its assistance, the German Foreign Ministry said.

Kinkel criticised Moslems and Croats that they had been too slow in implementing previous agreements and that there were far too many outstanding issues left.

The talks, held at the German Petersberg governmental palace outside Bonn, are attended also by U.S. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic.

Following a year of bitter fighting for control of territories with a mixed population, Bosnian Moslems and Croats bowed to U.S. pressure and signed in Washington in March 1994 an agreement to set up a binational federation.

The federation has largely remained a dead letter, with the federation partners blaming each other for such a state of affairs.

Using rather sharp terms in his address speech, Kinkel criticised Moslems and Croats for making almost no progress in transferring authority from the central, mainly Moslem government in Sarajevo to the federation.

Moreover, the process of setting up authorities in federation cantons is also too slow, he said, requesting that all officials boycotting talks to this end be replaced.

He said the resistance was most evident in Bugojno, Stolac, Capljina and Vares, saying they would be granted no reconstruction assistance.

During a break, Kinkel held separate talks with Granic. The talks dealt with the implementation of the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia's relations with Europe, reconstruction issues and the repatriaton of refugees sheltering in Germany.

Kinkel and Granic agreed that it was crucial that the federation be stabilised and that the implementation of the civilian aspect of the accords be concluded immediately.

They agreed that officials of interior ministries open talks soon on creating conditions for the transit through Croatia of Moslem refugees returning from Germany to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Bonn meeting was scheduled for late March, but Kinkel called it off because Moslems and Croats had failed to reach agreement on all issues.

Balkans: Croatia's Granic Comments on Talks With Kinkel

LD2504122296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A conference is being held in Bonn on the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. [passage omitted]

The Croatian delegation is being led by Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, who has already had a meeting with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. After his meeting, Minister Granic said:

[Begin Granic] recording] The purpose of this meeting was to achieve progress on the federation. This means reaching agreements and resolving all remaining open issues. We support this and similar meetings such as the forthcoming meeting in the United States of the forum for Bosnia-Herzegovina (?in connection with the federation).

As part of this meeting, I had the opportunity to meet Minister Kinkel. We discussed the overall situation in the region, especially the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, the normalization of relations with Belgrade, the strengthening of the federation and its firm linkage to Croatia, the Europeanization of the federation, and our bilateral relations, as well as the Republic of Croatia's integration within Europe.

Minister Kinkel gave particularly strong support to Croatia at the meeting of the EU Council of Ministers, and German MP's did the same yesterday, when they voted at the parliamentary session in Strasbourg.

The conclusion of this meeting is that Germany strongly supports the Republic of Croatia's integration within Europe and that there are huge opportunities for economic cooperation because Germany is interested in close involvement in economic cooperation with the Republic of Croatia. We also discussed numerous specific issues. [end recording]

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Balkans: Kinkel: Significant Progress Made at Bosnia Meeting

LD2504170496 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1544 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—Representatives of the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia today agreed during a meeting at the Petersberg in Bonn to set up a joint police force. [passage omitted]

The two sides of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation also declared their readiness to cooperate with the international tribunal in The Hague on human rights issues. Human rights envoys would for example be sent to all cantons. Kinkel said that, while this is not yet a "breakthrough," there had been "significant steps forward." The federation would only receive economic aid when there is progress in the "process of civilian reconstruction." For example, freedom of the press has to be guaranteed, and the new EU administrator of Mostar "absolutely has to be supported." The Dayton Agreement must be carried out "to the letter."

Kinkel said the "federation arbitrator," Christian Schwarz-Schilling, has proposed setting up a "sanctions council," with international participation. The latter should be able to "remove from office" those who breached their "obligations under the agreement." This "very interesting" proposal is being examined.

Kinkel met his Croatian counterpart, Mate Granic, on the sidelines of the meeting. According to the Foreign Ministry, the ministers agreed that the two countries' secretaries of state for the interior should hold talks to settle outstanding problems in the transit of Bosnian refugees through Croatia.

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Albania: Deselection of Deputies Causes 'Earthquake' in PD

AU2504204296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 25 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Rezear Xhaxhiu: Earthquake in the Democratic Party: To the Polls With New Names]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tirana—An earthquake has been caused in the Democratic Party [PD]. Most of its representatives in the just-dissolved parliament will bid farewell to any possibility of returning. This fate has befallen Ruli, Uka, Golemi, Anagnosti, and many others, according to decisions reached by the National Council during its almost five-hour meeting in the Palace of Congresses yesterday. The PD has chosen new names in which to place its hopes for the future. Only 25 deputies of the PD parliamentary group were able to gain a yes from the National Council. Familiar names from the PD's senior echelons have been left off the list, including Genc Ruli, Rexhep Uka, Mitro Cela, Rushen Golemi, and Rudolf Marku. If Ruli called the decision not to allow him to run unexpected, Rexhep Uka considered it a verdict to which he preferred to say, "no comment." The PD's official view mentions a range of reasons for replacing such central figures, such as age, diminished reputation, and lack of commitment, Shehu said, "These were the reasons borne in mind by the members of the National Council." For the PD chairman, it was more important to have people who are loyal to the party and its policies.

A massive influx of new names has invaded the party's list of candidates. They faced severe tests of their dedication, skill, and reputation. Ylli Vejsiu told GAZETA SHQIPTARE that "There is a range of professions, including many people with degrees and academic titles, and the candidates have been outstanding militants in the last four years." Ndricim Xhepa, Alush Shima, Genc Pollo, Fatos Beja, Xhevdet Ferri, and Visar Zhiti are some of the people who enjoy a high reputation and growing popularity at headquarters. The figures from the Albanian diplomatic corps summoned by headquarters to descend into the electoral arena are considered to be of a similar level. These include Pandeli Pasko from Rome, Pellumb Kulla from New York, Skender Shkupi, and Besnik Mustafaj. These men will leave their diplomatic seats to line up on the electoral starting line. Another group of diplomats has been taken out of Serreqis ministry. Vejsiu explains this influx on the grounds of their professional and intellectual skills. There are also a considerable number of women on the PD list. Ten members of the weaker sex will confront male candidates of the Socialist Party, mainly in urban centers. There are 19 other women on the proportional list. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 3]

Berisha on the List—An Honorary Position

Berisha has been given an honorary position on the list. He cannot run as a deputy, but that does not stop his being put on the list. This was the PD headquarters explanation of the presence of the president at the head of the proportional list. Shehu said that his presence was simply a token of respect by the PD. Thus the PD chairman put an end to the discussions that have swamped the pages of newspapers and the streets. Shehu says that Berisha has been chosen because of the reputation he enjoys in the PD.

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Bulgaria: Pavlov Discusses Russian Arms Deliveries

AU2604113796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 26 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov by Emil Spakhinski; place and date not given: "A Russian Company Will Deliver the Tanks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Spakhinski] Minister Pavlov, what has happened to the tanks that Russia gave us? Is it true that there is no money to pay for shipping them to Bulgaria?

[Pavlov] Of course not, what do you mean? Money is available. We have to wait until the budget is adopted. Then the money will be allocated.

[Spakhinski] How much?

[Pavlov] About 2.8 million leva.

[Spakhinski] How will they be shipped?

[Pavlov] The first tank and the first armored personnel carrier will arrive by air for publicity reasons, and all the rest will be delivered by ship across the Black Sea.

[Spakhinski] Will the shipper be a Bulgarian or a Russian company?

[Pavlov] A Russian state-owned company. The Russian Defense Ministry has chosen the most suitable shipping company. This was agreed in advance.

[Spakhinski] Minister Pavlov, contracts for regular service will soon be signed in the army, yet the code of regulations for applying the law has not yet been approved. Is this not illegal?

[Pavlov] No. We have a vast amount of work to complete, and we are trying to help things along. The agreements will take effect immediately the regulations are passed, and they will not be amended in any way.

[Spakhinski] It is said that many officers will refuse to sign their contracts.

[Pavlov] I have no such information.

[Spakhinski] How will you deal with those that refuse to sign?

[Pavlov] If they refuse to sign, they will leave the army.

[Spakhinski] Will they be made to pay for their training in the military schools?

[Pavlov] Yes, naturally, this regulation is included in the law.

Bulgaria: Supreme Court Rules Kurdzhali Elections Legal

AU2504153896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Court has ruled that the municipal elections in Kurdzhali were legal. The elections were held on 29 October 1995, and Rasim Musa was elected mayor.

With the decision it adopted today, the Supreme Court revokes decision No. 412 of the Kurdzhali Okrug Court of 5 February 1996, which canceled the results of the elections. In its decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that the election violations were insignificant and did not affect the election process.

Kasim (?Tsal), deputy chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] told the Bulgarian radio: We believed that the truth will prevail because the decision of the Kurdzhali Okrug Court was political and because it was adopted under the pressure of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. Only the BSP is responsible for the lack of legality, which existed until now in Kurdzhali and the region.

Bulgaria: Party Officials React to Kurdzhali Decision

AU2504205496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council and National Assembly member from the Kurdzhali Region, reacted today to the decision of the Supreme Court, which ruled the Kurdzhali municipal elections legal:

[Begin recording] We think that the decision adopted by a special collegium of Supreme Court judges is the result of crude political pressure on the part of circles close to the Presidency and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] headquarters. We suspected already in the past that a deal or political collusion would take place on the territory of Kurdzhali, in which the interests of Kurdzhali and the region would be sacrificed for the benefit of someone's presidential campaign.

We will certainly accept the decision of the court, as we repeatedly said in the past that we would do, but the struggle to preserve the Bulgarian character of Kurdzhali and the region will continue. We will continue our efforts to consolidate all nationally responsible forces, because Kurdzhali needs this. [end recording]

In a special declaration, the BSP Kurdzhali Municipal Council describes the decision of the Supreme Court as

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a cynical political deal that is the result of crude internal and external political pressure. The declaration also points out that the leadership ruled legal by the Supreme Court is actually illegal because the evidence submitted by experts had been ignored. Kurdzhali became hostage to the greatest deal regarding presidential power.

This is how Yordan Sokolov from the SDS reacted to the Supreme Court decision:

[Begin recording] The SDS has always trusted the judiciary in Bulgaria. We think that so far the judiciary has proved that it respects the laws and applies them correctly. We further think that by depoliticizing the judges, the judiciary really became independent—as the laws and the Constitution require. This is how our judiciary must look if we want to live in a rule-of-law state. [end recording]

Kasim Dal, deputy chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], said:

[Begin recording] The decision of the Kurdzhali Okrug Court was a result of BSP interference. Today the truth prevailed. We accept the decision of the Supreme Court. It is a final decision, and we hope that the BSP will also accept it, as they declared in the past, and that the local leadership elected by the people will take their seats and put an end to the anarchy. [end recording]

Kasim Dal also said that the decision of the Supreme Court shows that the DPS always acts in a prudent manner, without any radical measures. According to Mr. Dal, this victory over the nationalistic forays of the BSP is the beginning of the end to BSP rule in Bulgaria.

In connection with reports in the press today, according to which the Supreme Court decision had been determined earlier and is a result of a deal involving DPS support for Zhelyu Zhelev in the presidential elections, Mr. Dal said that the Supreme Court is not Zhelyu Zhelev's property. The DPS has not participated and will not participate in any deals.

Bulgaria: OKZNI Protests Ruling on Kurdzhali Mayor

AU2604101596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Court's decision to quash the annulment of the municipal elections in Kurdzhali is a grave act of national treachery, a declaration issued by the Nationwide Committee for Defense of National Interests [OKZNI] states. The declaration, which was disseminated in parliament by Democratic Left Deputy Dobromir Zadgorski, calls upon the organization's members and sympathizers to support Petur Stoyanov in the opposition presidential primaries.

Bulgaria: TV Chief Rejects Corruption Charges

AU1004134196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6-7 Apr 96 p 1

["DUMA PRESS" report: "Granitski: Someone Is in a Great Hurry To Replace Me"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I am not surprised that the report of the media commission's working group on the state of advertising in Bulgarian National Television [BNT] was read in my absence and in the absence of the marketing, advertising, and financial directors, Ivan Granitski told DUMA on 5 April. The report accuses him of creating conditions for corruption and illegal enrichment, showing tolerance for certain transmissions, and of lack of control over marketing and advertising. On 4 April, the parliamentary media commission submitted a draft motion for Granitski's resignation, which it will discuss at its next meeting.

On the basis of this report, the Chief Prosecutor's Office has initiated an investigation against Granitski, Deputy Chief Prosecutor Vladislav Slavov told journalists yesterday. I am not making a tragedy out of this, it is clear that someone is in a great hurry to replace me, Granitski commented on the news. In his view, this haste is a result of the lobbying by certain deputies representing particular economic groups whose interests have been affected by BNT's new financial and advertising policies. According to Granitski, thanks to these policies, national television has increased its revenues fivefold, but this has reportedly led to a reciprocal reduction in certain people's private bank accounts.

The final report of the auditors is expected within the next few days, and the report will be publicized by the BNT management. The Interior Ministry auditors have established serious violations and abuses during the period that Khacho Boyadzhiev was in charge, and they express approval for the BNT's new advertising policy. The correspondence with the auditors differs sharply from the report by the media commission's working group. At first sight, it appears that the deputies have tendentiously selected certain parts of the audit report, attributing Khacho Boyadzhiev's offenses to Granitski. Regarding many of the "shady deals" of which Granitski is accused, the auditors reach the conclusion that the blame lies with Boyadzhiev and the former advertising chief Ognyan Dimov. I am surprised that the working group did not want to meet with the auditors, Granitski said, adding that the auditors worked for six months with the full cooperation of the television management. [passage omitted]

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Bulgaria: Democratic Left MP's Vote To Keep TV Chief

AU2504101996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Report by correspondent Zlatina Georgieva from the National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] I will remind our listeners that early this morning the Democratic Left parliamentary group began a secret ballot to determine whether Ivan Granitski, director general of Bulgarian National Television, should remain in his post. About 30 minutes ago, we received a report from Deputy Stefan Gaytandzhiev that the group had decided by a majority of 10 votes that Granitski should remain as television chief. However, this information just goes to show that nothing in life is final because about 15 minutes later we received a second report that when the votes were counted it was found that two were invalid. Mariela Miteva, the chairman of the commission supervising the ballot, declared that the vote will have to be taken again. According to Deputy Elena Poptodorova, the second ballot will have no effect on the outcome, but has to be conducted on a matter of principle, to show that everything has been carried out correctly.

Bulgaria: BSP Deputies 'Revolt' Against Videnov

AU2604114196 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 26 Apr 96 p 11

[Article by Violeta Simeonova: "Revolt of the Ants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, 66 Socialists in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Parliamentary Group broke their oath of loyalty to the party and voted in a secret ballot to keep Ivan Granitski in his post of director general of Bulgarian National Television. A total of 56 voted against the motion. Only Todor Pandov, who was absent abroad, failed to show up for the ballot.

In the parliamentary lobbies, the Socialists admitted that Krasimir Premyanov and Videnov's men are waging a life and death struggle to decide who will control the 100-year-old party. The defeat of Videnov's supporters became apparent when they failed to push through Klara Marinova's motion proposing the dismissal of Ivan Granitski. The SDS deputies watched with interest as the drama unfolded in the Socialists' corridors. "They will vote until they are blue in the face," an SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] member commented with disgust in the lobbies. The secret ballot, however, preordained the outcome of the battle.

The situation in the Left has now changed radically, a Socialist admitted yesterday. Whereas previously we stuck together like leeches, now we have shown that we cannot fly on autopilot, disillusioned Socialists declared.

When the Left's meeting had been going on for four hours, Videnov could not stand it any longer and put the issue pointblank: "Either me or Granitski." Thus, the fight for Granitski's head proved to be a dress rehearsal for overthrowing Videnov. It was finally realized what can unite the extremes within the BSP; what Lukanov, Lilov, and Prodev share in common is their exasperation with the arrogant prime minister and panic about the party's future.

Without claiming the star role, Ivan Granitski has become the reason for the declaration of open hostilities at the heart of the 100-year-old party. The television chief probably found himself part of the scenario purely by accident, but as the situation evolved he became the star in the socialist drama.

The revolt of the red ants placed the Strategist, the Businessman, and the Bard of the BSP [Lilov, Lukanov, and Prodev] on the same side of the barricades. Heroic actions are in any case a characteristic feature of Ivan Granitski's stormy biography. The young admirer of Marx and Kafka gained fame through the barricades that he raised as chief of the badly treated "Khristo Botev" Publishing House. The Socialist biography of the current television boss reached its climax in the sad years of "blue power" [during the SDS administrations], when he had to defend the approaches to the publishing house for months on end by holding a sit-in strike.

Later, our Ivan became the party's golden boy, continuing demonstratively to pay his BSP membership dues with religious fanaticism. The most reliable reports on informers against could be discounted as mere gossip. Even his foes admit that the compromising information against him is not contained in notarized documents, but in the boudoirs of Sofia's beauties.

On top of all this, Granitski became the last Bohemian with an unblemished ideological biography, a man around whom intellectuals of practically every political hue swarmed like flies.

Although not linked to the Alliance for Social Democracy, Ivan Granitski has always been regarded as "dangerously close" to members of the internal opposition in the BSP. Thus, he drew public attention to the atmosphere of revenge and the neglected tendencies existing inside the party.

Even if the Left had succeeded in obtaining a debate on the dismissal of Granitski, the television boss in the National Assembly debating chamber, he would nevertheless have kept his job. The Rights and Freedoms Movement and People's Union would have supported

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him to a man, while the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] deputies would have abstained.

Granitski left parliament in excellent spirits. His only comment was: "They appointed me 10 months ago. Why did they not suspect that I would not submit to authoritarian orders?"

Bulgaria: Konakchiev Said To Demand Prodev's Removal

AU2404124096 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 24 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ekaterina Nikolova: "Konakchiev Demands Stefan Prodev's Removal Without Convening a Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Executive Bureau has issued a declaration against the DUMA daily stating that the BSP daily was wrong to publish and comment on conversations in the lobbies. The statement was prompted by a report published in the official BSP organ on 22 April stating that during the conference of the BSP organization in Sofia's Mladost District, Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev called Editor in Chief Stefan Prodev an enemy of the party and accused him of owning a villa that had cost millions merely to furnish. The left-wing press can criticize the Executive Bureau and its individual members, but the manner in which D. Konakchiev's view was reflected is unacceptable, the statement continued.

In the absence of any DUMA representative, the BSP Executive Bureau spent several hours discussing the DUMA report and the biting commentary on the report by Deputy Chief Editor Todor Koruev. The presidium of the BSP conference in Mladost District is reported to have sent a letter of protest to the Executive Bureau complaining that the newspaper report "arouses perplexity and is reminiscent of the well-known device employed by the opposition's newspapers, namely referring to private conversations." The local Socialists explain that Konakchiev attended the conference as a rank-and-file party member. If this is so, why was he the last to speak and sum up the debate? Koruev commented on the telephone to DEMOKRATSIYA. Koruev confirmed that he himself had heard the deputy prime minister's words that are quoted in DUMA. The conversation took place in the lobby, in the presence of four or five persons, one of whom was conference delegate Dimitur Gronev, Todor Koruev said, suggesting that these persons can be tracked down and asked what they heard.

If Prodev goes, the problems with the BSP newspaper will disappear, and it is not even necessary to convene a conference for this purpose, Doncho Konakchiev declared, adding that this is how one deals with enemies. He wants DUMA to doff its cap to the party, this is how he understands the press, Koruev said in his comment on Konakchiev's words. Koruev believes that the BSP leadership will try to compel Stefan Prodev to volunteer his own resignation.

At the Executive Bureau meeting the deputy prime minister denied calling Prodev an enemy, and claimed that he did not mention anything about Prodev's villa, bureau members reported. Even Aleksandur Marinov, head of the Sofia BSP organization, who is well known as someone who likes confrontation, came out in support of Konakchiev. Marinov was not present at the conversation, as he left immediately after Konakchiev's speech, Koruev explained. To investigate the incident, the Executive Bureau instructed Georgi Purvanov to meet Prodev to inform him that it is the task of the Socialists' newspaper to precisely report on party life and government affairs.

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Czech Republic: Commentary on Clinton's 'Tolerance' of Russia

AU2604065396 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 22 Apr 96 p 9

[Commentary by Petr Fantys: "Tolerance Could Harm Clinton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The present Russian and U.S. presidents are going to face elections later this year, and they both long to remain in their respective posts. While Yeltsin has been behind communist Zyuganov in public opinion surveys, Clinton is faring much better beyond the ocean. The Moscow meeting between the two officials, which took place on the background of the G-7 summit, was to help Yeltsin demonstrate that the West supports him. Clinton did his best to do just that. The meeting confirmed what has been obvious for some time now—the friend Boris and the friend Bob [as published] need each other and intend to support one another.

The reporters commented enthusiastically, particularly that Yeltsin has, for the first time ever, referred in public to the U.S. President by his first name. Nevertheless, expressing mutual friendship on the part of two supreme politicians carries with it certain pitfalls. How to maintain one's view, which in various areas differs substantially, and at the same time create an atmosphere of complete agreement and understanding at the news conferences is a particular problem. It seems, however, that in high-level politics it is easy: The "firm" stands are simply presented, and what the other side wishes to hear is "attached," even if it is almost in direct contradiction to the firm stands. In this way, the "sincerely" smiling politician says everything and nothing. It is fair to admit that, in Moscow, this tactic was more characteristic of Clinton than of Yeltsin.

Yeltsin's Blow Below the Belt

The presidents, according to their statements, successfully clarified their views regarding arms. Clinton was forced, however, to comment before reporters on several points that clearly undermine the Russian-U.S. bilateral relations. Yeltsin tripped Clinton slightly over the problem of NATO expansion. The U.S. President allegedly promised that he will do his best to prevent an "acceleration" of the process. According to Yeltsin, the dispute could be resolved by making the admission of each new member subject to Russian approval, which is in direct contradiction with the stand of the West. Clinton responded by stating that the Washington stance regarding NATO expansion has not changed.

Another unpleasant fact for Clinton in relation with Yeltsin is the war in Chechnya. After the Russian president spoke at the meeting to the effect that the war is over despite the ongoing fighting, Clinton practically admitted that Chechnya is a part of Russia. In doing so, he used an analogy—which came to many people as a shock—with the American Civil War, where the main issue allegedly was to preserve the Union. In the very next sentence, he emphasized every nation's right to self-determination.

The reasons for similar acrobatics and for both presidents insisting on the other's election are obvious. Clinton has an almost panic fear of communist Zyuganov becoming the ruler of Kremlin. The view of Yeltsin as a reformer conceals almost all of his faults at [illegible]ortcomings. Yeltsin, for his part, is probably con[illegible]d that a new Republican president would not be as tolerant to Russia as his present U.S. friend. Both statesmen must, however, above all, remember their respective voters—in certain respects, they must not "overdo" their mutual empathy. That is also why Yeltsin, whose position on the domestic political scene is not as strong as Clinton's in the United States, comes out a little sharper than the U.S. President.

Wasting Efforts

There remains the question of how much the show of Western politicians headed by Clinton helped Yeltsin. It is a fact, however, that ambiguity over and tolerance for Russia can harm Clinton substantially. Numerous political commentators believe that Clinton really "overdid" it in Moscow. The Republicans, who watch for any mistake Clinton makes, thus obtained an important trump card, and their main candidate, Bob Dole, will certainly use the U.S.-Russian issue in his election rhetoric. After all, it is not the first such incident on the part of the President.

Most Republicans have believed for quite some time that Yeltsin can no longer be saved and that Clinton is wasting his efforts. The U.S. daily THE WASHINGTON POST obtained a recording, according to which Clinton offered Yeltsin direct election assistance if he calls off the looming halt to the imports of U.S. poultry. The "poultry scandal" had to be corrected by the White House spokesman, who described the obvious interpretation of the recording as wrong. Far more serious are, however, the accusations of Clinton sacrificing U.S. interests in essential issues and thereby boosting the strength of the Russian president to conduct his, to a great degree, unfathomable politics. According to the Republicans, the burning political issues cannot be motivated by personalities—and their likes or dislikes—alone. Moreover, it is a question to what degree Yeltsin is a "suitable friend" for the President. If Clinton made

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a mistake regarding Yeltsin, it could have far-reaching consequences for the entire world.

At the Moscow summit, Clinton made at least one mistake. The parallel drawn between the American Civil War and the war in Chechnya must have offended many people in the United States. For ordinary Americans, Russia does not represent such a danger as in the time of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations between the two countries are watched closely all of the time, and any fluctuation in the relations with Russia can be fatal for Clinton in the 1996 elections.

Czech Republic: Solana Discusses Criteria for NATO Membership

LD2604112296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 26 Apr 96

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Czech television reporter Pavel Bouda; place and date not given—recorded, in English fading into Czech translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bouda] Prague is expecting, more or less, that candidates for entry could be selected in December. Do you consider that realistic?

[Solana] I cannot say this, Javier Solana says, because it would be premature for the time being, as you no doubt understand. But our discussions will continue this year. At the end of the year, we will assess the overall situation and decide how to continue. This decision has not been accepted so far. I would like to stress that your country has made an exceptional effort to achieve political and economic stability. It is no doubt one of the countries that has the closest ties to European and NATO structures.

[Bouda] You were in Moscow in person last month. To what extent, in your view, could Russia accept enlargement of NATO up to the former Soviet Union border or farther or in general?

[Solana] The decision to open NATO is a decision for NATO member countries, the NATO secretary general says, and naturally of countries such as yours that want to enter NATO. The construction or architecture of Europe's new security should depend only on free and independent countries that have freely decided what allies they want. Who does not understand this does not understand what stability and security mean for our continent. Your country has freely chosen which path to take. Nobody forced anything upon your country. You have decided freely as a sovereign country, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said.

Czech Republic: Development of NATO Entry 'Prague-Warsaw Axis'

AU2604092996 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 22-28 Apr 96 No 17, p 3

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "A Honeymoon of Convenience in Vyskov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This week in Prague, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana is to collect the documents confirming the Czech desire and readiness to enter into the North Atlantic Alliance. Experts from the Defense and Foreign Ministries have, to date, been working intensively on the documents. Of course, within the framework of our campaign to get into NATO, the "material for Solana" is just one aspect of the overall strategy. Another—far more complicated—one is the need to preserve unity among the applicants for membership, not to arouse the impression of intrigues against one another and not to provide a reason for mutual envy. The alliance's representatives have a paramount interest in ensuring that its potential enlargement takes place without the feeling of fatal loss among those candidates that are left out. Otherwise, instead of greater stability, the entire operation could bring greater instability to Europe. On the other hand, the favorites for entry have to manifest their joint will. At least, from this point of view, the meeting in Vyskov involving the foreign and defense ministers of the Czech Republic and Poland, which preceded Solana's inspection, was very important.

Slovakia Overboard

It is clear from a number of statements made by Western politicians that the alliance will be enlarged—if at all—gradually. Given this generally recognized condition, a certain rivalry among the candidates cannot be avoided. Nor can jealousy and a feeling of impending doom among those states that do not have too much faith in gaining entry in the first round. Namely, they are concerned that this first round will, for a long time, also be the last.

Countries such as Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia—FYROM] and Albania take a realistic view of their desire to be among the elect and are obviously reconciled to a longer waiting period. Bulgaria is gradually inclining toward Russia's suspicious view of the alliance. Although the Slovak Government continues to maintain that leading the country into NATO is one of its main foreign policy objectives, in practice, it is forging an ever closer bond with Russia. By the way, because of its domestic political development, Slovakia was excluded from a regular session

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of the MAG [expansion unknown] organization—an association involving the secret services of 12 European countries, including us and the Poles. This may be the first indication of how the democratic countries will behave toward the Bratislava regime. Development in Romania also arouses the same mistrust and caginess. The Baltic countries are concerned about the risk that, if they are left out of the first round, they will again fall into Russia's sphere of influence. The Czech Republic formally supports the admission of these countries into the alliance, not that there is any risk that too much comradely spirit would endanger its own hopes.

Hungary Has Problems

For two years, three countries—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—have been the favorites in the "duel" over membership in the alliance. Despite the fact that diplomats from these states repeatedly underline their support for their "rivals" and emphasize their unity, it is obvious that a hard game in which no one pays any heed to the difficulties of the other is under way. Hungary is in the worst position—on account of its unsettled relations with Slovakia, but mainly with Romania. Thus, Hungarian diplomats react resentfully to every inference that their country could be overlooked. When information from a report by the Rand Corporation—which was drafted for the Pentagon and favored the Czech Republic and Poland—was made public, the Hungarians intervened in the Pentagon, and its representatives had to assure the leadership of the Hungarian Defense Ministry that no decision exists. Similarly, the talks between Poland and the Czech Republic on a joint course of action in applying for membership in the alliance cannot make the Hungarian politicians very happy. And, in this very context, the world is now talking about a Prague-Warsaw axis.

Bilateral Talks Only

When the heads of the Defense Ministries of the Visegrad Four countries met in Warsaw three years ago, Czech Defense Minister Baudys's place at the meeting was taken by his first deputy, Jiri Pospisil. At that time, the Czech political elite reaped indignant criticism—first and foremost, from Warsaw—for its demonstrative rejection of the Four's attempt at a coordinated course of action. The aforementioned meeting in Vyskov involving the foreign and defense ministers of Poland and the Czech Republic has, therefore, been seen by some observers as evidence of a shift in the Czech approach. But this is not quite true: Our diplomacy still rejects a collective strategy, which is documented, for example, by Holan's speeches during his recent visit to Germany, and is unwilling to go further than bilateral talks.

The Czech-Polish meetings are a marriage of convenience. Politicians from the two countries are aware of their role as favorites among the applicants, and it is clear to them that mutual vilification and vying with one another would damage them both. Gone is Czech pride at the only right-wing government in the postcommunist countries, and the Poles, in turn, do not emphasize their "geopolitical weight," to which the Czechs are a mere appendage.

But, despite everything, the Vyskov meeting had more of a demonstrative character and was influenced by Solana's coming visit. The ministers signed a document on military cooperation—the Czech Republic signed a similar agreement earlier with the majority of Western countries. A convention on protecting classified information was also discussed, but neither we nor the Poles have a corresponding law, so the agreement is a matter for the future. It is the same with the talks on a joint course of action in air-force modernization. The ministers did approve the establishment of a Czech-Polish commission, but that is all for some time. Namely, no politician in the Czech Republic will, before the elections, be interested, to say the least, in the make of fighter aircraft.

Czech Republic: Portuguese Defense Minister Signs Accord

LD2604100096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense ministers of the Czech Republic and Portugal met officially for the first time in Prague today. Pavel Ryjacek reports:

[Ryjacek] The two ministers signed an agreement that, according to Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan, opens up another possibility for relations with the states of NATO's south wing. Basically, the agreement deals with the exchange of views on strategy and joint policy in Europe and knowledge concerning various military spheres, ranging from technology to military ecology and health care.

The Czech Republic is trying to enter NATO, and an exchange of experience helps this aim, Portuguese Defense Minister Antonio Vitorino said. According to the two representatives, the Czech Republic and Portugal have identical views on security questions.

Czech Republic: Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Zieleniec Meet

LD2504150996 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Venezuelan Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas has arrived for a two-day

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visit to the Czech Republic. Olga Krupauerova is on the telephone in the Cernin Palace:

[Krupauerova] The Czech Republic and Venezuela are two countries that can complement each other, Venezuelan foreign minister said after his talks with Minister Zieleniec. [passage omitted]

Minister Burelli said Venezuela needed the Czech Republic as a model for achieving economic development.

The trade turnover between the two countries for 1995 represents just under $5 million, while Czech exports predominate. The Czech Republic exports cars, above all, to Venezuela—Czech Felicias will soon serve as taxis in Caracas—then malt and glass products. It imports tobacco, fruit, aluminum, and coffee.

According to Venezuelan Foreign Minister Burelli, an increase in mutual trade should be helped by the abolition of currency controls. The Czech Republic has signed an agreement on the protection of investments with Venezuela, as well as a trade agreement.

An agreement on the prevention of double taxation is to be signed tomorrow.

Czech Republic: Daily: Holan's Admission Shocking Revelation

AU2604095096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 24 Apr 96 p 12

[Commentary by Martin Schmarcz: "The Army as an Impediment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The shocking revelation by Defense Minister Holan that certain generals are actively slowing down the Army's transformation is something more serious than mere admission of personal failure. The fact that there are still senior officers within the General Staff who have not divested themselves of their Warsaw Pact habits places our efforts to join NATO in rather a strange light.

A couple of days ago, Holan complained that the government has not paid enough attention to the Army. This was a typical lament from a weak Cabinet member, who does not know how to promote his views among his colleagues or to state the needs of his department. This is certainly not good when such a key ministry is involved. And now, when we hear that this same man is not even able to bring order into his own household, this is serious food for thought.

How can any positive changes be pushed through in an army whose senior commanders "in the past were used to great power that, at the same time, was unsupervised by anyone" and are now doing "everything possible to ensure that no one knows what they are up to"? Holan himself claims this, and his frankness confirms what the critics are saying about the failed rejuvenation of the Army's personnel. It is evident that, for the sake of the success of transformation, it is essential, mercilessly and quickly, to get rid of those who reject it. Instead of this, the minister belatedly comforts himself and us: "The majority of them have already reached retirement age and will soon leave the Army."

According to Holan's deputy, Kalousek (also Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party), the Army and the Interior Ministry are among the conservative institutions that resist all changes. Perhaps we could have accepted this as an explanation if the interior minister had not shown that it is possible to break the resistance of the old structures. Ruml's path of purges was a thorny one; he made a number of mistakes along it and was severely criticized for them. It is, however, better to act and make mistakes than merely to be defeatist and wait until the dogs in the manger retire.

In the Army, there are still people in important positions who, because of their absorption in the past, have nothing to do there. In short, during their four years in charge of the Defense Ministry, the People's Party has not managed to secure the elementary loyalty of the officer corps for social reform. This is bad because such an army will literally be an impediment on the path toward the euro-atlantic structures.

Czech Republic: Deputy Finance Minister on Economic Reforms

MS2604125496 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 26 Apr 96 p IV

[Interview with Vladimir Rudlovcak, Czech deputy finance minister, by Vincent Boland; place and date not given; from the FINANCIAL TIMES survey on the Czech Republic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mr Vladimir Rudlovcak, the deputy finance minister with responsibility for capital markets, is a reluctant regulator.

In at the birth of coupon privatisation, he claims that the structure of the capital markets this pioneering exercise created is unique and not comparable to that of other markets abroad.

"Our capital market is something specific. It is very difficult to compare it to any other emerging market, because 90 per cent of it is not a traditional capital market," says Mr Rudlovcak. "The question is: what should be on the capital market and what should leave it. We must now give natural forces the space to sort this out."

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One of Mr Rudlovcak's tasks is to oversee the markets supervision section of the ministry, which has come in for fierce criticism for its inability to enforce the rules that exist to regulate market activity. With 65 inexperienced and badly-paid staff trying to monitor the complex activities of increasingly sophisticated investors whose understanding of the rules is infinitely greater than that of the regulators, it is a thankless job.

Mr Rudlovcak insists that consolidation of the ownership structure that emerged from coupon privatisation is crucial to the development of the market. Regulation should not prevent that process, he says, and there is little the government can or should do to create the conditions where all investors will benefit equally because to do so could stop the process or slow it down.

"Why should I limit (the activities of large investors) while pretending to protect small investors? If I do, I'll simply stop this process of consolidation and small investors will end up much worse off if consolidation stops or slows down.

"I'm an opponent of false protection. The first duty of the government is to complete privatisation. From the beginning we had a principle that if we can, with minimum risk, proceed without regulation, we would. If I'm not compelled to regulate, I won't—until something changes and then I will change my approach."

Mr Rudlovcak is not convinced that now is the time to change the government's approach. He says he disagrees in principle with some aspects of the proposed reform package, particularly the clauses relating to mandatory buy-out offers where a shareholder takes a 50 per cent or higher stake in a company.

Financing for such buy-outs, he believes, will be difficult to raise. Investors who cannot raise the extra finance to make such an offer might decide not to move at all, he fears.

He also says there is unlikely to be any significant strengthening of the supervisory section to ensure that the new rules are enforced. He says he is sympathetic to the idea of an independent watchdog modelled on the US Securities & Exchange Commission, but until one is established he appears reluctant to see the ministry create an in-house watchdog that might ultimately be a barrier to it.

The reform package "will be absorbed over a year," he says. "Then in 18 months we can look again at setting up a new supervisory authority".

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Slovakia: Russian Ambassador on Trade, NATO Expansion

AU2504162396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "ao": "Syndrome of Besieged Fortress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The guest of yesterday's NOVE SLOVO [left-wing weekly] Club was Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, the first ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Slovak Republic. He emphasized the level of Russian-Slovak relations, noting that over 70 interstate and interdepartmental agreements between our two countries have been concluded over the last 40 months and that two-thirds of the largest Slovak companies cooperate with Russian partners. Regarding Slovakia's possible NATO membership, he said that, while each country has the right to decide itself on its integration into international structures, he sees no reasons for a hasty, mechanical expansion of NATO. This step could again evoke in Russia the syndrome of the besieged fortress and strengthen feelings of isolation from the rest of the world.

Slovakia: Meciar Views Austrian Concern About Mochovce

AU2604141096 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 26 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Meciar by Lucian O. Meysels; place and date not given: "We Accept Austrian Inspectors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Meysels] The contracts for the nuclear power plant in Mochovce have been signed. Have the die thus been cast?

[Meciar] We are beginning now. Ten years after Chernobyl, nuclear energy begins to develop again. As a result, the knowledge about safety is also increasing.

[Meysels] Austria's former Environment Minister Maria Rauch-Kallat claims that the money that is now allocated to safety will never be enough.

[Meciar] I cannot judge the minister's technical qualifications, but the companies responsibility for safety have to defend their international reputation. They guarantee safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] also assesses the project positively. I would like to stress that we are responsible toward our citizens, and therefore we insist on the highest safety criteria.

[Meysels] Could Austria have done something to prevent Slovakia from completing Mochovce amicably?

[Meciar] More than 50 percent of our energy demand comes from nuclear power. Austria does not have that much energy to compensate for this. In addition, the connections between Slovakia and Austria have been stopped by the Austrian side. Therefore, there are no high-voltage lines or pipelines through which energy could flow.

[Meysels] Bilateral relations remain good nevertheless?

[Meciar] Of course, nuclear power is a technical problem, not a political one.

[Meysels] Could it be that there is a mutual lack of understanding?

[Meciar] Nuclear power plants are also built in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. Why is no one afraid how relations with these countries might develop? As regards ourselves, we are willing to use Austrian experts for checks, and also the IAEA. However, we reject a link being made between politics and economics. If the Austrians reject Mochovce and the Hungarians Gabcikovo (the power plant on the Danube), should we return to candlelight?

[Meysels] A last question about the new law that has been called—perhaps a bit strangely—"state protection law" by Western media. What does it mean?

[Meciar] The media are strange, not the law. Similar legal stipulations exist in various Western countries. I do not understand how the impression could arise that there would be large numbers of trials in Slovakia. After all, the protection of human rights is subject to international standards. By the way, the law is still in parliament.

Slovakia: Press Speculates About Recall of Ambassador

AU2504141696

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 24 April publish a number of statements by church representatives and politicians in response to "speculations" about the recent "recall" of Anton Neuwirth, Slovak ambassador to the Vatican, to Bratislava "for consultations." The statements react, in particular, to allegations that the move was a response to the Vatican's appointment of Archbishop Dominik Hrusovsky, who is considered to be one of the few supporters of the present government in the Slovak church hierarchy, as apostolic nuncio in Belarus, an appointment that some commentators described as Hrusovsky's "political exile."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 24 April on page 2 carries a 650-word report by Juraj Alner on an interview given to him by Anton Neuwirth, Slovak ambassador to the Vatican. The interview, the place and date of which are not given, is published under the headline "A. Neuwirth: I Do Not See Any Connection Between the Appointment of the Apostolic

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Nuncio and My Invitation to the Slovak Republic." The report states: "Commenting on the statement by the DPA agency, according to which 'Meciar's government took this step [of summoning Neuwirth for consultations] to express its disagreement with the sending of Dominik Hrusovsky to Belarus,' Neuwirth stated: 'I have no idea where DPA got this information. I do not see any connection between the appointment of the apostolic nuncio and my invitation. I am surprised that the media came to such a conclusion.'" Neuwirth, who, as Alner observes, arrived in Bratislava on 19 April, four days after Hrusovsky's appointment, claims that the aim of his current stay in Slovakia is to "prepare materials that will be the subject of talks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: a review of my activities and a comprehensive analysis."

The ambassador is also asked what he thinks about the opinion of Slovak commentators who "see Hrusovsky's appointment as an expression of the Vatican's disagreement with the growing conflict between the government and the church in the Slovak Republic." Neuwirth replies: "I am horrified by the wording of this question. I do not think that there is a growing conflict. I think that the media is wrong to dramatize this issue and politicize everything. I would be glad if this atmosphere calmed down. The strengthening of mutual trust is in the interest of both Slovakia and the Catholic Church. The relationship between the Holy See and the Slovak Republic is based primarily on mutual trust and the expectation of good will. Let us maintain this tone."

In conclusion, Neuwirth is asked to comment on the situation within the Slovak Catholic Church. He concedes that he "perceives some attempts at division," but believes that "these are only external expressions, while there is no conflict on the issues of faith and ethics."

On the same page, NARODNA OBRODA carries a 500-word report by Julius Gembicky on an interview given to the daily by Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). The report is headlined: "J. Carnogursky: It Would Be a Disgrace If We Prematurely Recalled an Ambassador Who Spent Seven Years in Prison for Espionage for the Vatican." Asked about the "speculations in the Slovak press" establishing a direct connection between the appointment of Dominik Hrusovsky as apostolic nuncio in Belarus and the summoning of Ambassador Neuwirth for "unscheduled consultations," Carnogursky says that, while he has "no insight" into the Foreign Ministry's decision-making, he considers the timing of Neuwirth's "recall" unsuitable and unprofessional. He believes that Minister Schenk could have known that this move would give rise to the above speculations, particularly as no reasons for the recall had been given.

Carnogursky is also asked whether he thinks that Neuwirth, who used to be a parliamentarian for the KDH, might be recalled from the Vatican post for good, after only two years as ambassador. Carnogursky says: "I cannot reply to this question because I do not know what the government's intentions are. But it would be a victory of party egotism over the state interests of the Slovak Republic. Ambassadors usually stay in their posts for three to four years. Moreover, Anton Neuwirth's position in the country of his operation is perhaps the best of all ambassadors of the Slovak Republic. Let us not forget that, in the 1950's, Mr. Neuwirth spent seven years in jail for espionage in favor of the Vatican. It would be paradoxical if the government were to recall him prematurely now, when he has the chance to 'spy' for Slovakia in the Vatican."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 24 April on page 2, under the headline "There Is No Need To Speculate About D. Hrusovsky's Appointment," carries a 300-word report by Eva Laukova on a news conference organized by the Slovak Bishops Conference (KBS) in Banska Bystrica on 23 April. Laukova says, among other things: "At a news conference yesterday, Mons. Rudolf Balaz, KBS chairman, responded, among other things, to speculations about the appointment of Archbishop Dominik Hrusovsky as apostolic nuncio to Belarus. There has been talk about Hrusovsky's progovernment orientation and the Vatican's decision has been described as the sending into 'exile.' Mons. Balaz said: 'When the Holy Father appoints a bishop as nuncio, he automatically promotes him to archbishop. That is the first great distinction because, relative to the size of our country, we have a large number of high-ranking church dignitaries. The appointment should not be viewed negatively, there is no need to speculate about it and to kindle fires. No one should think that the Vatican, whose main representative is the Holy Father, lets itself be manipulated....'" According to the PRAVDA report, Balaz also rejected rumors that the KBS or he personally had anything to do with Hrusovsky's appointment: "None of us has anything to do with it. I say on my honor—I have not dropped even one word on this issue, with no one. I spent the entire last week in Rome at a congress and it was only there that I learned that Archbishop Hrusovsky had been sent as nuncio to Belarus."

The KBS briefing is also subject of a 250-word report by "klo," entitled "Mons. Balaz: Archbishop Hrusovsky's Appointment as Nuncio Needs No Further Interpretations," in Bratislava SME in Slovak on 24 April on page 2. The report includes the following passage: "Asked by CTK whether Archbishop Hrusovsky's departure would mean a great loss for the Trnava-Bratislava archdiocese, Mons. Balaz replied that none of us is irreplaceable."

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Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 23 and 24 April publishes in two installments a 3,200-word interview with Archbishop Dominik Hrusovsky by Jan Szelepcsenyi entitled "Slovakia's Spiritual Renewal—Task for All Generations." The interview, the place and date of which are not given, includes the following passage:

"[Szelepcsenyi] What is your message to those who believe that your appointment as apostolic nuncio is a victory for those church dignitaries in Slovakia who did not always find your views congenial?

"[Hrusovsky] The decision to send me to Belarus was made autonomously by the State Secretariat of the Holy See and, in the final analysis, by the Holy Father himself. I have verified this myself because I would not have accepted such an assignment if it were just the application of the known saying Promoveatur, Ut Amoveatur [Latin term used]—Let's promote him to get rid of him.... When someone asks me whether I am leaving with joy or with grief, I say that these are irrelevant questions. Decisive is not my joy but the will of the Holy Father."

Slovakia: Kovac Optimistic on Outcome of Kidnapping Case

AU2404153796 Bratislava SME in Slovak 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "eta": "Michal Kovac Is Confident That We Will Learn the Truth About His Son's Kidnapping Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kremnica—At a meeting with the mayors of Kremnica and the surrounding communities, President Michal Kovac voiced the conviction that the affair of Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping would be solved in a short time. Some 300 to 400 residents greeted the president in front of the town hall with applause. "The truth about my son's kidnapping will come out, the question is who will believe it," the president said. "It does not take much to assess, also on the basis of what we already know, who had an interest in the kidnapping. The kidnapping affair was part of the campaign for the president's resignation." At the same time, he said that it was beyond doubt that the Slovak Information Service [SIS] had participated in the kidnapping, probably together with other security components. He also presented evidence from the last few days suggesting that the key figure in the Technopol case—Peter Krylov—is a secret service employee, although no documentation on this exists.

Slovakia: Head of State-Owned Insurance Company Dismissed

AU2504100596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by "alg, TASR": "Chairman of Slovenska Poistovna Board of Directors Recalled, Apparently in Conjunction With Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Supervisory Board of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company, SP] yesterday recalled Mikulas Trstensky from the post of chairman of the SP Board of Directors. It did so on the basis of a proposal of the National Property Fund [FNM], the SP's majority shareholder (50.5 percent of SP's shares are in the FNM's portfolio). SP Supervisory Board Member Milan Rehak, vice president and chairman of the FNM Executive Committee, refused to comment on this move. Mikulas Trstensky retains the post of SP director general. According to sources of the daily SME, which claim to be well informed, Mikulas Trstensky is to be recalled also from this post at an extraordinary meeting of SP shareholders being demanded by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Dr. Trstensky's dismissal raises questions because the SP achieved outstanding results in 1995. According to SME's sources, the change in the post of director general could be connected with the approaching privatization of financial institutions, among which the SP is one of the most lucrative. Mikulas Trstensky supposedly represents the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]. He is supposed to be replaced as director general by Dr. Hudec, who is close to the HZDS. According to the same source of information, Stefan Gavornik, also a ZRS representative, is to be recalled from the post of FNM president at the next meeting of parliament on the initiative of the HZDS and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 25 April on page 1 carries a 300-word report by Eduard Zitnansky on the personnel change in SP management, which notes that the SP is by far the most important insurance company in Slovakia, having collected more than 7.5 billion korunas in premiums in 1994, while the second largest insurance company, Kooperativa, collected 0.57 billion korunas in premiums.]

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Slovakia: Ex-Minister's Role in Privatizing Spa Revealed

AU2204154896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 19 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by "(uj)": "The Privatization of the Sliac Spas, Completed Last Fall, Is Still Shrouded in Secrecy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Although the Sliac spas were privatized last fall and—in the opinion of the experts—were sold for a ludicrous amount, to this day it is not clear under what conditions their privatization took place.

Former Health Minister V. Sobona was also involved in the privatization of these lucrative spas. Another former health minister, T. Sagat, has been trying in vain since last year to find out about the background to this privatization matter in the National Property Fund (FNM). "I do not like it that the first credit repayment of 30 million was made by a man against whom a complaint has been lodged at the Prosecutor General's Office," said T. Sagat, who even this week did not get anywhere in investigating the privatization of health care facilities at the FNM. The deputy chairman of the FNM Executive Committee refused to show his the documentation, despite the fact that each deputy has a legal right to ask for it. "I wanted to see all of the materials, one after the other, but, they merely invited me to a discussion and assumed that this would be enough," said T. Sagat. He is also—so far, without success—trying to bring to an end the case of the mismanagement of state budget resources at the Health Ministry during V. Sobona's term of office. At that time, the Supreme Inspection Office (NKU) brought to the surface a number of interesting and surprising facts at the ministry concerning the squandering of money amounting to several million. To this day, the case involving a contract for Siemens hardware worth 67 million German marks—which was realized in 1993 without a selection procedure—has not been fully dealt with. Although complaints have been lodged at the Prosecutor General's Office, the case has still not been closed.

Slovakia: Bratislava Mayor Contests Meciar's Claims

AU2304122696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Apr 96 p 4

[TASR report: "P. Kresanek: No One Asked the Municipal Authorities for Any Buildings; Bratislava Mayor Responds to Vladimir Meciar's Statements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In an interview for Slovak Radio's Radiozurnal program on 19 April 1996, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar declared that the transfer of some central agencies from Bratislava to Banska Bystrica has been caused by the mayor of the capital of Bratislava, who does not wish central agencies to reside in Bratislava. The reality is such, however, that no specific premises have ever been requested from the municipal authorities of Bratislava," reads a statement provided by Peter Kresanek, mayor of Bratislava, capital of the Slovak Republic, for TASR. According to Peter Kresanek, as early as 1992 the municipal authorities of the capital of the Slovak Republic drafted a study containing a complete list of real estate meeting the requirements for the placement of representative institutions. This study was sent to the Slovak Government Office.

"We therefore have to assess the prime minister's statement as a false attempt to defend the arbitrary moving of central agencies out of Bratislava, which does not meet with understanding and support among a number of citizens," Peter Kresanek stated.

Slovakia: Fico Considers Situation in SDL, Policy

AU2504122396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Robert Fico, candidate for the post of SDL chairman at the coming SDL congress in Nitra on 27-28 April, by Martin Krno; place and date not given: "Entry Into the Government Is Unacceptable to Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Krno] You are 31. Does it not take courage to run for the highest post of one of the parliamentary parties at your age?

[Fico] My candidacy is not the result of excessive efforts on my part or of my persuading functionaries of district structures to propose me for this post. The nomination came about quite naturally, mainly, I believe, on the basis of my activity thus far in parliament and in the regions, where everything is always closely related to politics. I feel neither too young nor too inexperienced for the post. But neither do I see the post as some fetish, without which I would be unable to exist. Politics is not competitive soccer where the player's career is over at 35. You can achieve outstanding results even at the age of 60. I am prepared to conclude a political agreement at any time before the congress, even at the price of giving up my candidacy. Provided, of course, that we agree on a personality that will guarantee that the party will pursue the path determined for it by the upcoming congress.

[Krno] The hardest nut to crack in Nitra [venue of the upcoming SDL, Party of the Democratic Left, congress] will probably be the selection of Executive

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Committee members who will be capable of cooperating successfully. In case you are elected chairman, how do you want to make sure that they all pull together?

[Fico] The guiding principle in constituting the new leadership must be to have everyone represented in it who has great influence in the party and, at the same time, a deep sense of responsibility. Otherwise, it would have been pointless to hold the congress ahead of schedule. It would have been possible to leave Peter Weiss in the chairman's position and let him continue having trouble with the group of people around him and permanently seek compromise solutions to satisfy all currents of opinion in the party. That would only be detrimental to the party. I cannot imagine the new leadership—I am thinking of the chairman and deputy chairmen—not including three people: Peter Weiss, Brigita Schmognerova, and Lubomir Fogas. The others will be a matter of political agreement and discussions, which continue.

[Krno] For the time being, it seems that the greater part of Executive Committee members will not be replaced. Is your party not in store for another year of compromises?

[Fico] There existed two options—entry into the government and an unequivocal left-wing opposition policy. I am convinced that the delegates will decide for the second option. I suppose that someone may perceive the composition of the new leadership as a compromise. But this leadership will have no choice but to implement the political direction of the fourth congress. Let those who agree with opposition left-wing policy run for the Executive Committee. Those who disagree with it would do better if they gave up their candidacy right now.

[Krno] Are you going to declare an embargo, until the next parliamentary elections, on attempts to integrate the SDL into the present government coalition?

[Fico] The attitude toward the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has always been a cause of problems in the SDL. If we opened a debate about it, it was chiefly to solve it once and for all. It seems to me that we were successful in this, although there was the risk that it might erode citizens' confidence in us. The precongress discussion and the latest steps of the government coalition confirmed us in the conviction that joining this government, with its characteristic style of politics, is unacceptable to us. Therefore, it will not be necessary to declare any embargoes. If someone kept harping on this issue after the congress, he would be toying with his own political death.

[Krno] A recent Statistical Office poll showed serious reservations about the SDL's policy among people in the 18-29 age bracket. What do you intend to offer them, besides your age?

[Fico] Unfortunately, the SDL's policy thus far has been difficult to comprehend for the youngest categories of voters. Young people demand clear language and clear solutions to problems that directly affect them. Often, we devoted great attention to other age groups at the expense of the young generation. We were paying less attention to young families and the obstacles they have to overcome. [passage omitted]

[Krno] The left will scarcely be successful in the parliamentary elections in two and a half years if it remains as divided as it is now. Of which cardinal mistakes of one and a half years ago should the Common Choice coalition beware?

[Fico] A strong left-wing bloc within one or two years is an illusion. But we must try to communicate. It should start with bilateral meetings. With the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], for example, which is close to us in terms of its program, it is necessary to engage in a permanent discussion on social issues debated in parliament. We should be interested in the closest possible cooperation. Naturally, we will respect the ZRS's participation in the government coalition, to which, understandably, it has certain commitments.

[Krno] But the ZRS chairman's repeated statements about your party do not suggest that he would want to cooperate with you....

[Fico] Of course, the initiative on our part is greater. On the whole, I understand that they are cautious in communication with the SDL. But this is to the detriment of all workers. We would be able to enforce many things together. I am an optimist, however. The ZRS is not just Janko Luptak. Our closest partner is the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]. Both our parties are interested in maintaining close relations. The prospects of some kind of a merger are the best with the SDSS, although it will be a longer-term affair. Our next task after the congress will be to join the Socialist International as an independent, strong left-wing party. Only then can we contemplate higher forms of cooperation, or an outright merger.

[Krno] What is your attitude toward the new Communist Party of Slovakia [KSS], which also identifies with the left?

[Fico] We have been dodging this issue until now because this is a very sensitive matter. But I think that many people are waiting for our reply. The SDL is not a communist party. It has undergone transformation into

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a modern left-wing party, which proceeds from certain values of the left-wing movement of the past. In my opinion, it is necessary to constantly call to mind, above all, the social advantages of the pre-1989 period. It is necessary to build on many of them and to combine them with the elements of a modern democratic state based on the rule of law. We have to respect the KSS, if for no other reason than because it has recently taken over a part of our members and sympathizers. I do not think that room exists at this moment for open cooperation on the all-Slovak scale. After all, many KSS representatives are not sparing in their attacks on us. Routine mutual communication with the KSS must be the same as with other political parties. Certain contacts could develop at the regional level.

[Krno] And what about the often mentioned opposite pole of the political spectrum—the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]?

[Fico] It must not console us that the sympathizers of this movement are applauding us. They are never going to vote for us. As far as practical policy is concerned, we should not be joining forces with the KDH. Likewise, we must not join an opposition bloc that would be headed by Christian Democrats. Again, this would only cause us harm. We are a strong enough party to pursue opposition policy on our own. But when it comes to the defense of basic human rights, democracy, and the Constitution, it is necessary to cooperate with anyone. As far as attitude to the present government coalition is concerned, we must be uncompromising on social issues and must not be afraid of getting into sharp confrontations. But when the government puts forward a reasonable proposal that would help Slovakia, there is no need to dig in our heels right away. First and foremost, however, it must be us who come up with positive solutions. We must not be a party that will only continuously react to the statements and deeds of others.

[Krno] A certain progovernment daily has called you a young lawyer who knows all the tricks of the trade. Do you agree with this description?

[Fico] What kind of a lawyer I am must be assessed by those, in whose name I was dealing with some legal problem. Of course, I enjoy law tremendously. I would characterize myself as a pragmatic, leftist-minded man. It is probably due to my family background. I am no fundamentalist who would go into political extremes. I am looking for the most suitable solutions for everyone, but these solutions are always left-oriented.

[Krno] What makes you a better candidate than the other five?

[Fico] That is hard to say. They include an economist, a diplomat, experienced managers and politicians. I suppose that my advantage is that, sometimes, I am able to call a spade a spade and speak more comprehensibly.

Slovakia: Poll Depicts Satisfaction With Parties

AU1904154896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 Apr 96 p 5

["Statistical Office Report": "The Citizens Are Most Satisfied With the Political Steps of the HZDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the documents on the agenda of the 66th session of the cabinet was the report of the Slovak Statistical Office on the public opinion survey under the heading—Opinion of the Citizens Regarding the Territorial and Administrative arrangement of Slovakia, the entry of the Slovak Republic into NATO, and other topical issues.

While the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] received the largest percentage of approval from the respondents in the assessment of the domestic political measures by the major political parties and movement, the Hungarian Coalition (see attached table) registered the largest percentage of disapproval. For the purpose of a summary analysis of the stands by the respondents on the individual steps of the political entities, in addition to the percentage of approving and disapproving answers, the table also contains the coefficient of agreement with the domestic political measures of the political parties and movements which is calculated as the ratio of the number of approving and the number of disapproving respondents.

Most respondents in the 18-24 age group agree with the steps of the HZDS (41 percent). At the same time, this group had a significant share of those who are not interested. The respondents from the 25-29 age group also agreed mostly with the steps of the HZDS (37 percent), and the Statistical Office found among them a higher share of approval for the work of the DU [Democratic Union] (36 percent) and the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] (32 percent) and the greatest disapproval with the steps of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] (50 percent). In the 30-39 age bracket, 41 percent of respondents agree with the HZDS, which, although slightly below the overall average, is the largest approval for the group. Characteristic for this group is a larger rate of disapproval with the domestic political steps of the ZRS [Association of Workers of Slovakia] (59 percent). In the 40-49 age group, the HZDS (47 percent) gets most approval, while more than average cannot identify with the work of the Party of the Democratic Left (55 percent). Approval for the HZDS (40 percent) also dominates in the 50-59 age group,

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while the ZRS (60 percent), the SNS (57 percent), and the SDL get above-average disapproval. The group of respondents aged 60 and above is characterized by a higher rate of approval for the HZDS (53 percent), the SNS (40 percent), the ZRS (40 percent), and the KDH (31 percent). Half of the respondents in this category disagree with the steps of the DU.

Considering the territorial administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic, at the time of the survey, most respondents leaned towards the status quo. The favorable effect of the OECD membership of the Slovak Republic was appreciated by almost two thirds of those asked. Entry into NATO is supported by a third of respondents, and almost half support the idea of military-political neutrality.

Opinion of the Citizens Regarding the Domestic Political Measures of the Political Parties and Movements Operating in the Slovak Republic

Political Party/ Movement	Agree	Disagree	Coefficient of Agreement
	Percent		
HZDS	49.13	50.87	96.59
SDL	44.40	55.60	79.85
SNS	40.43	59.57	67.88
DU	39.14	60.86	64.31
ZRS	36.76	63.24	58.12
DS	34.81	65.19	53.39
KDH	30.11	69.89	43.09
Hungarian Coalition	12.14	87.86	13.81

Slovakia: Poll Shows Support for Penal Code Amendment

AU2404162196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Changes in Penal Code Through the Prism of Public Opinion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One controversial item of the 14th session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic was the discussion on the government draft of the Penal Code amendment. This amendment expands the range of acts constituting crimes against the republic by introducing sanctions for nonviolent forms of damaging the Slovak Republic and it also concerns some offenses in the economic sphere. From 25 March to 4 April 1996, the Institute for Public Opinion Research operating under the Slovak Statistical Office carried out a representative poll, in which it ascertained, apart from the public's interest in this issue, also its views on the necessity of amending the Penal Code. As transpired from the replies of 1,164 citizens above 18, 8 percent of those polled are thoroughly familiar with the articles that amend the Penal Code, 40 percent have perfunctory knowledge of them, and 52 percent do not know them.

In another part of the poll, respondents who said that they had thorough or at least perfunctory knowledge of the wording of the amendment—this concerned 543 of those polled—also presented their views on the necessity of this amendment. Their replies to this question are illustrated by the following table.

Is the amendment to the penal code necessary or not?

	Percent
Necessary	34
More necessary than not	25
More unnecessary than necessary	12
Unnecessary	23
Unable to assess	6

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Hungary: President Says Conditions for Western Integration Met

LD2504163296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary is secure and there is no military threat to its borders, President Arpad Goncz has said. The president delivered a speech to a session of the Hungarian-EU Association Committee, in which he also said the conditions for the country's integration had been secured. Levente Suekosd reports.

[Suekosd] President Arpad Goncz said that Hungary was doing its utmost to join the European Union. There was a political consensus on this, and the institutional conditions had been created; we were striving for full membership, and we considered NATO membership as part of the integration process.

Arpad Goncz said: Hungary feels secure. There is no military threat, according to indications, but joining the North Atlantic organization will be a pledge of stability for us. More than 70 percent of our exports go to Western markets; the economic process is irreversible.

A member of the European Parliament, who is also a member of the Slovak-EU Joint Parliamentary Association Committee, remarked that he felt Slovakia might have fallen behind in the integration process. In his opinion, Slovakia's halfhearted ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty had increased the uncertainty.

Arpad Goncz's reaction to this was that we would not like the EU's so-called Schengen border to lie between Hungary and Slovakia, or between Hungary and Romania. The national minorities can assert their dual identity in Hungary.

Hungary: Ambassador to U.S. on NATO Expansion, Relations

AU2604081096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 25 Apr 96 p 6

[Interview with Hungarian Ambassador to Washington Gyorgy Banlaki by Oszkar Fuzes in Washington in April 1996: "The Beauty Contest Is Over, the NATO Entrance Exams Are in Progress—Our Washington Ambassador on the Experiences of One and a Half Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our assessment in the United States has become positive, and we have a secure place among those who have a chance of NATO membership. However, the expansion itself is embedded in the world political context, therefore, rather than being impatient, we should be preparing, preferably together with our neighbors, Hungarian Ambassador to Washington Gyorgy Banlaki says. Banlaki discussed his latest impressions and the experiences of his 18 months as ambassador. He started by saying "nowadays, I feel fine in this position."

[Fuzes] You studied in the United States, and you have spent most of your career here. Is it possible that your overall good mood is just the compulsory optimism learned from the Americans? To what extent has the American way of thinking changed you?

[Banlaki] Certainly to the extent that I can tune myself to the U.S. way of thinking. In my ambassadorial work, it is useful to be able to present the Hungarian opinion in a way that the Americans understand, and I can translate U.S. reactions into the "language" of Hungarian understanding. Which is more difficult? I would not like to say.... The good mood is created by the fact that, 18 months after the initial ideas, my work is progressing well.

[Fuzes] What is the value of the ambassador of a small country in the capital city of the only world power?

[Banlaki] Whether elephants fight or make love, the grass gets trampled. Being the citizen of a small eastern European country, one often gets the feeling of being part of the grass. However, looking around in today's Europe, after the states of the size of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Poland, and Romania, there is a group in which Hungary is not so small.

[Fuzes] Does Washington have a central European ranking system in its politics? Officially, of course, it does not, but an ambassador can perceive the possible existence of one....

[Banlaki] Naturally, the Americans act as gentlemen and do not let us feel that we are small in an absolute or relative sense. It is obvious that the much bigger Poland is "more important" than Hungary in a certain sense, although this does not set us back either in the warmth of the relationship or in the level and content of cooperation. Hungary is the United States' 67th economic partner. The line is long before us, but we are not at the end of it.

Not at the End

[Fuzes] Other, more important considerations also exist. [sentence as published]

[Banlaki] At one time we were the counter-example country, but this was lost after 1989 with the evaporation of the ideological dimension. Paradoxically, Hungary, which did so much for the big change, lost its relative advantage and the role of favorite stepchild when this change took place. In the past, it was true that the worse the neighbors appeared, the nicer we looked.

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We must forget this! It is no longer good for us if others have it worse. What is good for us now is if the neighbors with whom we are compared are also doing fine and we progress together. Without them we cannot solve the problems inherited by our region, and especially the new tasks to catch up. The beauty contest is over. It makes no sense to be pushing in the way; for example, this happened when a foreign newspaper published a distorted interpretation of a recent Rand report, in which it claimed falsely that Hungary had lost its place among those countries that have a chance of NATO membership. At the same time, we must not start screaming about such things and enter the falsification competition, exaggerating certain elements or opinions. In fact, there was no need for a heart attack even if the article had been correct. The issue of NATO's expansion will continue to be the subject of tough debate and complex analyses for a long time to come, none of the early remarks and preanalyses are final. There is no point in being impatient anyway, because no one is interested in arbitrary demands; they will not speed up the schedule. On the other hand, the possible delay is not due to the condition of the applicants, but rather it is rooted in the soil of major politics. Instead of spending every minute analyzing the problems, statements, and plans, we should simply be preparing, indicating clearly and with facts that we wish to join. Rather than banging on the door, we should let ourselves be seen. I believe that this is what we are now doing. As a matter of fact, we would have to implement the modernization even if it was not a condition for our admittance to NATO.

[Fuzes] A few days ago, in Williamsburg, a big think-tank conference was held on all these issues, probably the first one of many such events. What did you say and what did you hear there?

[Banlaki] The level of the conference was very good, and I am happy that I managed to contribute to it as the only European ambassador. The good news is that Hungary has not at all slipped on the list of prospective candidates. They talk about the first round of Polish, Hungarian, and Czech nominations naturally, unequivocally, and without question. Much less often is the fourth Visgrad country, Slovakia, mentioned. However, it is obvious that we have no influence on the decision on the main issue, namely what NATO itself will be like and the whole future of U.S.-European relations. And the expansion actually depends on this and on the way the attitude toward international participation evolves in the United States. NATO has decided to expand, but, to do so, it also has to change itself. This is just as exciting a subject for the Belgian ambassador as for me.

[Fuzes] The Implementation Force [IFOR] and then, especially, NATO admission will cost us a lot of money.

[Banlaki] Yes, but this price should be compared to the cost of independent defense. It is well known that the neutral countries spend much more because they do not have the established system of the alliance and the partnership of development.

The Morals of Expansion

[Fuzes] How is it possible to make expansion attractive to the receiving side?

[Banlaki] It can be said, for example, that U.S citizens have invested billions of dollars, and the safety of this does matter. Moral considerations also can be effective in the United States: expansion is moral as well as logical. Today, NATO can do the same for the eastern part of the continent as it did after 1945 for the western part: It can historically consolidate the newly democratic countries. If it fails to do this, then winning the Cold War was in vain because it will again lose the peace. The historic specters and ancient rivalries can return, and new dangers, conflicts, and floods of refugees can also appear. It also makes some difference for Uncle Joe [as published] whether military, emigration, environmental, and criminal threats are fought at the appropriate places and far from Nebraska or close to his farm and country. It is also a historic experience that, when the Unites States leaves, it must pay a big price for the consequences.

[Fuzes] Why could we not have an independent European security system?

[Banlaki] In theory, it could perhaps exist, but in practice it cannot be implemented. No continental political cohesion or will exist for this.

[Fuzes] Another argument against NATO expansion is that it will be expensive for Western tax payers.

[Banlaki] Those who calculate with dozens of billions of dollars forget about a comparison. Those who do not forget, calculate that it is much cheaper to expand NATO and transform it for conflict prevention than to handle and solve crises with a delay or to set up a so-called separate security system. The expansion and transformation of the existing NATO in a span of 15 years would only increase the costs by 1 percent, which is roughly equivalent to the cost of a mechanized division. Without this and without security, many more divisions might be needed.

[Fuzes] Our main foreign policy goal is to be an as-good-as-possible partner, and later an ally, of the United States, which is already stationing troops in Hungary.

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Does this mean that the Washington ambassador is something like the former Moscow ambassador?

[Banlaki] No. On one hand, that was always a political position, and I do not think I am a political appointee. On the other hand, the two countries and the two relationships are not the same, either, and this is the essence. From the American side, the limitation of our sovereignty cannot ever emerge in any form and to any extent, there is no place for any dictates. They do not want satellites, they have enough problems without them.... At the same time, naturally, they express their opinion. For example, they left no doubt about the fact that, in their view, the consistent implementation of the Hungarian stabilization program, settling the IMF talks, and completing the basic treaties would improve Hungary's position. This was not a command or direct pressure, even if the weight of the U.S. Government's opinion was such that it also has importance for the U.S.'s friends and other countries, too.

Resolution Capability

[Fuzes] Is the U.S. urging for the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian basic treaties a formal intent for checking these items out? And can they see how difficult it is to agree with the current Romania and Slovakia?

[Banlaki] On the U.S. scale, the resolution capability is indeed different. However, those who deal directly with these issues are well informed, we make sure of this. Of course, the other side is doing the same. They can also see that a basic treaty or the statement of reconciliation in themselves are not remedies for everything. However, these can provide a positive symbol and a basis for overcoming the historic burdens.

[Fuzes] You have been working here 18 months. During this period, Hungary's image has fluctuated, to say the least, and at some points, U.S. statements used the term catastrophic.

[Banlaki] One and a half years ago, very many doubts existed due to the rapidly deteriorating economic developments and the problems like the HungarHotels case. The stabilization, first gradually and then drastically, dissolved these doubts. This was done by consistent implementation, rather than by announcement or by explanation during last year's—in my view, successful—prime ministerial visit. By the end of last year, a qualitative change took place in the assessment of Hungary. To return to your first question, I also feel fine because the IMF agreement, the forint's convertibility, the OECD membership, the enactment of the media law, the IFOR participation, the 1996 budget, and the wave of privatizations have had a rather positive reception. This also creates new possibilities that we will try to utilize, for example, through the events of the millenary in the second half of the year, among other things.

Hungary: Socialist Deputy Views Party Issues

AU2504115996 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 24 Apr 96 pp 1, 7

[Interview with MSZP deputy Antal Schalkhammer by Eva Vasvari; place and date not given: "Society Expects Compensation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vasvari] The Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] congress did not ensure places for the left-wing formations in the party leadership. What are your views on this?

[Schalkhammer] Party leadership members indeed say that the left-wing tendencies have been temporarily pushed out of it, but this is not true. It was clearly proven at the congress that the MSZP has remained a party with a social democratic concept. Naturally, the platform tendencies, which indicate that the MSZP is not a unified party organized on the basis of ideology, are markedly present.

[Vasvari] Is it possible to know the proportion of the deputies who are committed to social democratic values in the rather large Socialist parliamentary group?

[Schalkhammer] In my view, the left-wing direction is characteristic of all platforms. However, it is obvious that we must define what we mean by the term left-wing party in this period of society. In my view, it cannot be said to be the same as the former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party or the current Workers' Party. Rather, it means the representation of a European style left-wing and social-democratic value system.

[Vasvari] In your view, did the congress clarify the open issues, especially on economic policy?

[Schalkhammer] What it has not clearly done is the possible change of economic and social strategy, although an expectation for this did exist. Personally, I hoped, in addition to demonstrating party unity and settling personnel issues, we would formulate a concept that continues to place emphasis on balance and stabilization, but that only includes the amount of restriction that does not exceed society's tolerance level.

[Vasvari] The trade unions were pushed out of the party leadership but not from the party. How much longer can it be tolerated that the needs of the majority of voters cannot be expressed?

[Schalkhammer] It is a pity that a strong trade union leader who represents clear views—who could better represent the employees' interests—did not get into the

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party leadership, but I must say that the trade union is strongly present in the party, and this is important. Naturally, if the MSZP wants to adhere to its basic values it has to look upon the trade unions as allies. It is also certain that clearer consultations and cooperation within the party would do no harm.

[Vasvari] While the left-wing structures have much of the voters' backing, they are increasingly finding themselves in the background in the party. Is this unpleasant?

[Schalkhammer] That is not the point. To its misfortune, the MSZP inherited an indescribable economic and financial situation in which, to avoid a complete crisis, it had to introduce an implementation practice that differs from its purpose and is alien to social democracy. This power has had to and will have to perform this task to implement its strategic program. This is none other than a secure economic growth supported by performance and an export-oriented market-building policy. [passage omitted]

[Vasvari] To what extent is it a schizophrenic state that the MSZP is implementing the Alliance of Free Democrats program—since [former finance minister] Bekesi's time—rather than its own?

[Schalkhammer] Indeed, this is a coalition program and not the MSZP's original election program. However, in the interest of stable governing, we have to make coalition compromises.

[Vasvari] However, the electors are questioning you about the original program. How can you account for it to your voters?

[Schalkhammer] Not easily. The citizens make up their mind on the basis of their daily experiences and they are not much comforted by the improvement in macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, it would be important for the MSZP and the government to talk more about the fact that putting a sick economy in order can take five or even 10 years.

[Vasvari] If the economic policy drawn up on the basis of left-wing values cannot prevail in the long run, is it possible that the party will split?

[Schalkhammer] Many predictions have been made on the split of the coalition and the MSZP but these have not proven correct. Nevertheless, I believe that left-wing values must be better represented in the daily work of the party and the government. Perhaps, after the drastic measures in 1995, we will now have opportunity for conducting politics led by greater consideration and more social sensitivity. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Police Fear Spread of Money Laundering, Crime

AU2504140896 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 25 Apr 96 p 7

[Correspondent's report on interview with Laszlo Nemeth, deputy head of the Economic Protection Department of the Hungarian Police Headquarters; place and date not given: "The Many Secrets Protect Those Who Commit Crimes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An increasing number of crimes have been solved in the past three years, ever since the Economic Protection Department of the Hungarian Police Headquarters has been in operation; the number of discovered crimes has reached 8,600. The damage incurred is close to 100 billion forints.

"We must accept the fact that we are a target country and, because of our geographic location, international economic criminal activity is organizing through Hungary," Laszlo Nemeth pointed out. At the same time, both international and domestic crime make use of the institutions of the transitional economy that are undeveloped or are functioning uncertainly. This type of crime also uses the hastily legislated contradictory laws and the chaotic legal situation. This is one source of the black economy and the related economic and so-called white-collar crime.

It is no accident that, in addition to the surveillance and territorial coordination departments, a special group was set up within the Economic Protection Department in charge of money laundering issues. There is a danger that Hungary could become the center of money laundering. The conditions are there and the banks, insurance companies, gambling, and free trade in hard currency are already working; lax regulations open the way to abuse. A total of 1,200 cases of suspected money laundering have been reported to the police so far, and criminal proceedings are under way in one case. The specific case affects the territory of three countries, although we are not talking about big sums here, only about $700,000, a sum originating from embezzlement. However, the real number of money laundering cases must be much higher. Therefore, we are not only relying on the banks' obligation to report such cases but we also deploy types of secret surveillance to observe this area, with particular attention regarding privatization and the establishment of banks. It would be much easier to discover or prevent the domestic economic crimes if we had a property declaration system. Today, no person and no institution have the right to ask the "new rich" where they got the money to purchase luxurious palaces and Mercedes 600 luxury cars, to build stadiums or to

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accumulate works of art; not even if their tax returns show a minimal income and are obviously fake.

Surveillance operations by the economic police show the typical crimes, Laszlo Nemeth pointed out. Among other things, this is how we discovered the illegal use of export allocations, like the Stadler affair in which we will soon initiate legal proceedings, and the oil affair connected with the lawyer Szep, an example of customs abuse. I could also mention the export of used cars where the enterprises in question received extra income from requests for value-added tax refunds.

In Hungary, the bank, tax, and other secrets and personal rights protect those who commit crimes, because these rights give them a certain amount of security, as these rights are much more severe than in the developed market economies where those who commit economic crimes are sentenced very quickly and they are also deprived of their property. There is no such danger for economic criminals in Hungary because, even if they are sentenced after years of court proceedings, these criminals may spend one or two years in prison and then live on as rich people. In other words, their property remains intact.

According to Laszlo Nemeth, organized crime in the classic sense of the word is not yet present in Hungary, although the economic crimes are mostly committed in an organized way. Economic criminals operate in well-organized groups, methodically, and with a division of labor, and they have considerable financial, technical, legal, and other expert means at their disposal, and they are quite deliberate in their activities. Moreover, they try to obtain long-term contacts and positions among the economic decisionmakers and at the supervisory and state administration bodies. There are also signs of international connection already, as well as signs of the intention to set up sister centers for foreign organized crime in Budapest, especially centers for the Eastern and Balkan mafias. Fortunately, the Hungarian police are aware of all this and, according to Laszlo Nemeth, we have succeeded in halting this trend so far.

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B-H: Croatian Paper Accuses Bosnia of Terrorism

AU2604114996 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 15 Apr 96 pp 12-14

[Article by Marko Barisic: "From War Into Terrorism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Had a terrorist group from Bihac not been identified and arrested during routine traffic control near Senj, one of these days, probably at about eight o'clock in the morning, while Fikret Abdic is traveling from Opatija to Rijeka Continental hotel where the offices of Agrokomerc are situated, the sound of a portable rocket launcher would have gone off tearing the passengers in a beige Mercedes with Austrian license plates into smithereens. Bearing in mind that the road via Preluka is packed with cars full of people hurrying to work at this time of the day, numerous other Croatian citizens who happened to be in the area would probably suffer, too. Traffic chaos would ensue in Rijeka while the international agencies would again report a new act of terrorism on the Croatian coast. Minister Jarnjak would release a statement that the hunt for the perpetrators was under way, while Croatian tourist workers would sit helplessly in their offices, reading the cancellation letters from the major tour operators. The Adriatic Sea would stand half empty this summer because the tourists recoil equally from the war-torn areas as they do from terrorism.

Routine Check Stopped Terrorists

The only ones who would rejoice would be the Bihac headquarters of the AID (Agency for Investigation and Documentation) for a job well done that was probably commissioned by Sarajevo. Even Izetbegovic would probably invite his like-minded party buddies (Bicakcic and Ceric) for a festive round of bridge, while the Bosna-Herzegovina Ambassador to Zagreb Kasim Trnka would probably also send an encrypted report to Sarajevo, as the entire action would have taken place within his area of responsibility, in the Republic of Croatia. The secret police (AID) of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] would thus justify the money spent on its formation, while the Iranian instructors would be able to return home because they could rest assured that their pupils had learned "the material."

All this was prevented by a routine traffic control, when the police became suspicious first of the documents of a car bearing Bihac license plates and later also of the passengers themselves. After they started to talk, the scenario of a terrorist action, which differed from other similar ones in the fact that it was backed by the leadership of neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, started to unfold before the eyes of the investigation officers. This is precisely what is unique to this case: Similar terrorist actions over the world are usually backed by liberation movements or independent groups. The international community stigmatized only a handful of countries as themselves supporting and financing international terrorism. To Iran and Libya, Bosnia-Herzegovina should now also be added, that is, the Muslim authorities from Sarajevo, to be exact.

Justification of U.S. Fears

It is perfectly irrelevant in the case of Fikret Abdic that he is a former Kladusa leader and the president of a new party (DNZ) [Democratic Peoples' Community] which intends to run at the autumn elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only thing that matters for the Republic of Croatia is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs officials of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina planned to carry out a terrorist action on its territory. This means a neighboring country violating the sovereignty of another country in the most blatant way, and in so doing not only meddling in its internal affairs but also endangering the safety of its citizens, creating fear among the population, affecting economic trends (tourism, for example), and in effect undermining its stability. The AID agents probably had all this in mind when they decided to carry out such an action precisely at this time, just before the onset of a tourist season from which Croatia hopes to earn about $2 billion. A politically and economically strong Croatia would endanger Izetbegovic's plans for domination over the Croatian partner in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. That is where, first and foremost, one should seek the reason for this terrorist act (terrorism does not merely include perpetrated acts but also their preparation) and only afterward in Abdic's possible electoral success in western Bosnia.

The U.S. insistence that AID be disbanded, its chief Bakir Alispahic removed (which was done), and that the Iranian instructors whose objective was the formation of this agency leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, is now clearer. The Americans justified their demands by possible terrorist actions against their soldiers, however, it is evident that the underlying fear concerned the formation of a parastate secret police which, as required, would act as a terrorist group and would actually be a threat to security in this part of Europe.

The attempted assassination in Rijeka actually confirmed the U.S. fears. It was also a unique pointer of the political orientation of Izetbegovic's SDA. It is quite clear now that the Republic of Croatia will have problems with terrorist actions by the Sarajevo government in the coming period.

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Relying on the Secret Police

It is illusory to expect that Izetbegovic would renounce AID, which safeguards his control over the political processes in his own peoples, regardless of the blackmail that he is subjected to, especially from the United States. This simply involves a transfer of the Iranian concept of a parastate military police with whose assistance the country keeps control over its own population and ensures influence among the famous terrorist groups in Egypt (Jamma al-Islami), Israel (Hamas), Lebanon (Hizballah), and so on. AID would serve this purpose in Bosnia, that is, Europe. According to reliable reports, Izetbegovic decided on the formation of this service at the very beginning of the war. About 10,000 people are engaged in this service and their main pillar of support is in the repressive sector, that is, in the army and the police, however, not also the crucial one, as one would have expected. The masterminds of the entire service are actually in the Islamic religious community and in diplomacy. It thus comes as no surprise that Bakir Alispahic, after being replaced as the head of AID, was appointed deputy foreign minister. In this way he continues to perform his job, which means that the agency is still active in the realization of the goals for which it was set up, namely, the creation of the Muslim state on the designated territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with an internal setup that would reflect the Iranian concept of the Islamic state. The main obstacle to the realization of Izetbegovic's ideas are the parties and the politicians among the Muslim peoples who champion a secular internal setup of the Turkish type.

Playing With the Fate of the People

In this light, the recent split between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and the remarks that some individuals in the SDA leadership made about Ganic do not come as a surprise at all. The campaign that Izetbegovic's media (LJILJAN, AVAZ) waged against Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic, who is actually the most successful military leader among the Muslims (he defended the strategically most important portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina near Brcko), also becomes more transparent. Of course, one of Izetbegovic's nightmares is also Fikret Abdic, his former colleague in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and the man who gained the most votes at the last elections. After he crushed Beslagic with the help of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army (his departure is definite), and following Silajdzic's departure, the only man left as a serious political opponent to Izetbegovic at the elections is Abdic. Since any legal process would sooner resemble a farce than a court action because this nevertheless is all about political differences, Izetbegovic evidently opted for Abdic's physical removal as the safest way to accomplish complete control over the electorate of his own peoples at the next elections. He evidently could not wait for Abdic to start an electoral campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina to stage some "unfortunate accident" but decided for a terrorist action on the territory of the neighboring state. Tudjman will not forgive him easily for this and we can expect the distrust between Zagreb and Sarajevo to deepen, despite the illusory accord over the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. As a result of all this the group around Izetbegovic could, instead of a European and the U.S partner, become an international problem and all this in such a manner that it would be forgotten who was the victim in this war and who should be helped financially in the reconstruction, which could influence the future political position of the Muslim peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the attempted assassination of Fikret Abdic, which is essentially a private feud, Izetbegovic put too much at stake. It is reckless even for him, and he has experience in such matters, because it is one thing to put at stake Srebrenica or Gorazde in some political game, and quite another the fate of the entire peoples.

[Box, p 14]

Why Is Kasim Trnka Silent?

Quite some time has passed but the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador to Zagreb Kasim Trnka has not found it necessary to comment on the entire affair at all. Since the people undergoing the investigation are Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens and on top of this also employees of the state offices (Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Internal Affairs) his behavior is rather unusual. Namely, it is customary in such cases to issue at least some sort of a protocol statement in reaction to the reports by the investigation services of the Republic of Croatia, which on top of this also issued a protest note to the temporary charge d'affaires of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb. Does this mean that Kasim Trnka knows about whole affair and does not want to be privately compromised in the public by certain facts that the Croatian investigation services might uncover, or is it perhaps that some employees of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy are also involved in it. Something like this is not impossible when one knows that the Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic missions are the AID headquarters and when one knows what sort of things can be organized from these missions. It came as no surprise at all when the Americans discovered the Iranian instructors who were the employees of the Iranian Embassy in Sarajevo in a terrorist camp near Fojnica.

In light of Ambassador Trnka's frequent visits to Bihac and Velika Kladusa, it not impossible that, when

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this terrorist action was planned, the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb and the Bihac branch of AID acted in coordination. Especially as Trnka gave full support to the AID employees in western Bosnia who terrorized the local population in an organized fashion. His cordial relations with the Kladusa Mayor Stulanovic, who excels in the persecution of the returnees from Kuplensko camp, are widely known, as are the relations with Cazin and Bihac "security agents," many of whom "earned" their current posts through classical assassinations of the reputable citizens from that area (that is how AID came into being in Bihac).

Besides, one should not forget that the arrested members of the terrorist group are merely the perpetrators, while the organizers are elsewhere and they as a rule do not perform such dirty jobs. Being the employees of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb they hold diplomatic passports, which means that they have immunity on the Croatian territory, and many of them traveled freely, collecting information and organizing state terrorism.

The court will, of course, judge how great is the responsibility of individual persons and institutions, but a dark suspicion that he is not entirely innocent in this whole affair has nevertheless fallen on Ambassador Trnka, a former university professor. That is why the Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador should react and distance himself from the terrorist group as well as from the intention to transplant the Iranian model of state and secret police on European soil. For this case is not merely about an individual, Fikret Abdic, but about the state credibility of the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo. To illustrate how terrorist actions are being handled nowadays we must say that even a man like Serbian President Milosevic renounced KOS [Counterintelligence Service] activists who planted bombs against the Jewish Community and the Jewish cemetery in Zagreb and staged a trial for them in Belgrade. If official Sarajevo has taken the other way and if Ambassador Trnka tacitly agrees with this, then it is not impossible that Croatia may soon follow suit, and, in diplomatic terms, deny him hospitality.

B-H: Zubak Interviewed on B-H Federation

AU2504152596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 17 Apr 96 p 6

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mirjana Micevska; place and date not given: "Resignations Have Turned Into Show Business"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sarajevo agreement has been signed, the obligations have been accepted and the duties delegated, and now in public there have appeared different interpretations of some parts of this agreement, originating from the allegedly inadequate translation of the agreement from the English language. The president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak, one of its signatories, says the following about that:

[Zubak] As far as the Croat side is concerned, we find nothing disputable. The mentioning of alleged mistakes made in the process of translation of the document is only an attempt to mystify the reality before the public. It is obvious that some people have no courage to take over responsibility for what they have agreed upon. As far as the Croat side is concerned, there should be no more unclarities; we will respect the things that have been agreed, and we will not diverge from that in any way. The deadlines are indeed hard and fast, and it is physically hard to achieve all that, and the entire burden now falls on me, on Mr. Ganic [vice president of the federation] and on some five or six people more.

Unclarities Concerning the Signature

[Micevska] There have been some statements that Ganic signed the agreement without previous consultations.

[Zubak] When it comes to the Sarajevo agreement, I do not wish to be an advocate of Mr. Ganic concerning some statements claiming that he is responsible for the agreement, and that he signed it without previous consultations. But I can explain the way it happened, because I have read Mr. Bicakcic's statements in OSLOBODJENJE—if, of course, he really said that, because I am no longer sure who said what, or if he said it at all, or if the journalists added to it. All the time we had a complete team, we had a draft text ready, and on the basis of that we had talks that went on for several hours. Mr. Prlic [minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina], Bilandzija [federal minister of finance and deputy prime minister], myself, Ganic, Muratovic [prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina], Kapetanovic [federal prime minister], and Bicakcic were present. We talked about all the issues, and at one moment Ganic said that he had to go, because he had official duties; he asked for a break of half an hour for himself, and we should continue the work. I said that that was all right, although I was against it. I agreed to that under the condition that he delegate the responsibility to Muratovic, Kapetanovic, and Bicakcic, so that they could go on with the talks. That was the way we worked through the entire agreement. When Mr. Ganic came back again, there were some additions, after which we accepted the agreement.

[Micevska] Do you believe that within the Federation the refugees will return to their homes?

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[Zubak] I hope so. We can have the good will for that, but we will hardly be able to solve that problem alone, without the help and the guarantees of the international community.

The Return of Refugees

[Micevska] What do you think about the possibility for all the Croats to return to Vares and all the Bosniaks to Stolac within a period of several days?

[Zubak] Mr. Ganic and I were in Stolac, in order to encourage and incite a return in the political and psychological sense. An agreement has been signed, but UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] has still not found the means for the restoration of the devastated houses of the Bosniaks. Croat refugees from Kakanj and Vares are accommodated in one part of the undamaged objects. Now it depends exclusively on whether UNHCR will find the means for the restoration of the destroyed Bosniak houses, in order to make their return possible.

[Micevska] Is there an agreement between the leaders of "Herzeg-Bosnia" and Fikret Abdic about the refugees from Kuplensko [camp for refugees from Velika Kladusa] allegedly populating Stolac?

[Zubak] I have heard about that, and I was appalled to see how far one can go in that media war, used for the statements of individuals who see politics as a means for personal promotion, as show business. That is absolutely untrue.

[Micevska] In public you often declare yourself as the representative of all Croats in the Federation.

[Zubak] The representative of the Croats—what is disputable about that? I am the representative of the club of Croat delegates in the parliament, which consists of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party]. I was nominated for this function by the representatives from the Croat people. Some add that I said I was the president of all Croats, which is not true. I am the representative of the Croat people in this post.

Threatening With War

[Micevska] Once you said in Sarajevo that if things did not move any further, the Federation would once more be threatened by a renewed breakout of war between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Zubak] I do not remember having said that. If you have in mind my words said at the panel discussion of Bosniak intellectuals, that was not what I said. BH PRESS reported it in the wrong way, and that is why I no longer cooperate with them. I have the original speech, according to which I said: "If these differences that exist between us are not removed, we are doing futile work, which can, as some say—I quoted the NEW YORK REVIEW—turn into war." I did not say that it would come to a war. You see, that is another way of conducting a media war; it is the same as with these latest rumors that I went skiing on the Mt. Bjelasnica [Serb-held].

[Micevska] Is the situation really such that Gojko Susak [Croatian defense minister] must publicly announce the deployment of the Croatian Army for the purpose of the protection of Croat interests?

[Zubak] I am often asked to comment on other people's statements. This time, concerning Mr. Susak, a part has been torn out of the context of his speech, so that one can make various combinations. He said one thing that is clear, a position that is defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, namely, that it will take care of the position of its citizens in other countries.

The Croatian Army intervened when in Bosnia-Herzegovina not only the interests of Croats were endangered, but also the interests of the Bosniak people. In accordance with that, the Split agreement was signed and the entry of the Croatian Army regulated. I cannot see a reason for anything to be disputable, in Gojko Susak's words that, if the interest and the political status of the Croat people were endangered, Croatia would use all disposable means for their protection. That was not an open threat but merely a fact. I believe that the representatives of the Bosniak people here should take care of the position of their people in Sandzak.

Demands for Resignations

[Micevska] You and Ganic have lately been directly blamed for the lack of the Federation's success. What do you think about the demands for your resignation? For example, those coming from the SDP [Social Democrat Party]?

[Zubak] Why do they not present that before the parliament? They should not turn that into a show, but present and resolve it at the appropriate places. I know where problems lie for me. My problem is how to build the Federation with people who have already declared their opinions against this political orientation. One should have seen the reactions of the SDP in the time of Kutiljero's [name as published] plan. They, who earlier criticized all that, now present themselves as the strongest fighters for the Federation, for the establishment of cantonal authorities, and they would even like to teach us how to build a state. I believe

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that I do not need to be taught, that I have much knowledge there. I am quite certain that politically I am in that position. You should analyze the former statements of those who now demand our resignations. Particularly with regard to Kutiljero's plan, as the plan of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is only one of its variations. Earlier I wrote some texts in Herzeg-Bosnia that were never published, and they were in favor of the Federation. My political option is not disputable at all, and those who used to claim that that political option was impossible should think things over.

[Box, p 6]

Cooperation With The Hague

[Micevska] Does "Herzeg-Bosnia" accept the Hague tribunal, and will it take care that those accused of war crimes travel to The Hague?

[Zubak] Herzeg-Bosnia accepts the Hague tribunal. However, it is not an international legal subject, so its judiciary cannot communicate with the Hague tribunal. We also have complete documentation about numerous crimes that were committed against the Croat people of Herzeg-Bosnia. The problem is that Judge Goldstone cannot give a warrant to the police of Herzeg-Bosnia, because that would mean its recognition, which the international community does not want. It is a contradictory situation. People are accused as members of the army of Herzeg-Bosnia, yet its legality and legitimacy are disputed. There exist some legal problems there, but there is nothing disputable about the political orientation.

[Box, p 6]

The Declaration Unnecessary

[Micevska] What do you think about the declaration about the unified Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zubak] For me, all that has been going on is unusual. It turns out that now there are some new forces that wish to divide Bosnia. I do not think that there is something new on the international and on the domestic plane now tha was not there already half a year ago, before and after Dayton. I believe that it has much to do with reasons of a quite different nature. After all the political platforms, declarations, agreements, it seems that some political forces no longer enjoy the trust of their people, so they wish to affirm themselves again.

I believe that we, representatives of the Croat people, do not need the declaration, we have already made our choice, we have taken part in the referendum for Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have signed all agreements.

About the "Happening of People"

[Micevska] One of the leaders of "Herzeg-Bosnia," according to GLOBUS, compared the Bosniak visits to their relative's graves in the territories from which they have been exiled with Milosevic's 'happening of people.' What do you think about that?

[Zubak] I have already said that I do not like to comment on other people's statements. Visiting graveyards should not be stated as a reason for going to certain areas. I believe that visiting graveyards is not in the tradition of the Bosniak people, but if that is what people wish, they should be enabled to do that.

B-H: Assembly Chairman on Establishing 'Federation of Cantons'

AU2504142096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said, in his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council discussing the Dayton agreement, that this agreement was a painful compromise for the Bosnia-Herzegovina side, but that we accepted it in the belief that it would lead to the reconstruction and reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite many question marks. He said that now—four months after the signing of the Dayton peace—the war has stopped and Bosnia-Herzegovina has been divided into two entities. Lazovic said that there are many expelled people and refugees that want to return home, and the priority of the international community should be to enable them to do so. Without people returning home, there will be no lasting and stable solution, there will be no peace in Bosnia or in Europe, Lazovic said.

Our aim is to strengthen daily the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of the entities and develop and widen it to the entire territory, thus encompassing the Serb nation, so that, in the end, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be set up as a federation of cantons, Lazovic said, stressing that only such a Bosnia-Herzegovina can be a guarantee of stability and peace in the former Yugoslavia.

B-H: Ex-Prime Minister Silajdzic Warns of Bosnia Breakup

BR2604075096 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Apr 96 p 9

[Report on interview with former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Ulf Andenaes in Oslo; date not

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given: "Former Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic: 'Bosnia Is Breaking Up'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Bosnia is in greater danger today than it was six months ago when the war was still going on," the country's former prime minister believes.

Haris Silajdzic, who recently stepped down as Bosnia's prime minister, is challenging the governing Muslim Nationalist Party to a power struggle. He broke with President Alia Izetbegovic because of what he considers to be growing nationalism within the governing party. Silajdzic and his supporters want a Bosnia in which the various ethnic groups can live side by side.

"Under the surface of apparent peace the country is breaking up further," he said when we met him during his short visit to Norway. "The principle of separating ethnic groups from each other is well on the way to being implemented. The outcome of such a development will be the division of Bosnia. I want to ask the international community to take immediate steps to prevent such a calamity. The inviolability of the country's borders must be guaranteed. Today our borders are wide open and totally unprotected. The country is like three states, only one of which has a legal government."

"So far, the Muslims have shown that they are the most generous and tolerant group in Bosnia. This will change very swiftly if the Muslims are hemmed in between former enemies in a narrow space."

Difficult Election

Silajdzic's newly formed multinational party intends to fight against the Muslim nationalists in the election that is scheduled to be held in Bosnia before the end of the summer. Half of the electorate has fled or been displaced. There are no democratic institutions that can guarantee credible elections. "In my opinion, just 1 percent of the mass media are independent of the government. I hope this situation will improve, but I have not seen any progress made yet," Silajdzic said.

So would it have been better to wait with the whole election circus under these circumstances? His answer is no. "Delaying the election in Bosnia could all too easily mean delaying democracy," Silajdzic said.

Does he fear an Islamic-led society in which there is no longer any room for different cultures? "I am surprised that Islamic fundamentalism has not grown stronger, as a reaction against the persecution suffered by my Muslim ethnic group," he said.

How about the prospects for the election? "Many people in Bosnia know that they have been betrayed," he said. "They know that since the extremists came to power on the various sides half of the population has vanished."

During his stay in Oslo, Silajdzic met with Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal and the Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee. He also took part in an event with some of his fellow countrymen who are refugees in Norway.

B-H: Ambassador Presents Proposals Regarding Federal Army Act

AU2504183296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Muhamed Sacirbegovic, ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations and special advisor for affairs concerning the implementation of the Dayton peace accord, presented last night in New York City proposals approved by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which concern the federal forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to those proposals, the federal act on armed forces should be based on the principle of the full integrity of military forces within the federation, and possibly within the whole country. [sentence as received] In addition, it is proposed that army officers on active service not take part in elections or be appointed high officials of political parties, and that military units should not be formed on the basis of or identified with ethnic or religious affiliation. It was also emphasized that the realization of these proposals is necessary for further adoption of the democratic and western-oriented character of the federal military structures, in agreement with interests of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding integration into Western, European, and NATO defense and political alliances and structures.

B-H: Minister Soljic Views Federal Defense Issue

AU2604093196 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 Apr 96 pp 31-33

[Interview with M.S. Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "HVO Has Not Stolen Muslim Money!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina signed in Sarajevo in late March, envisaged that the Federal Ministry of Defense would become operational based upon the Federal Law on Defense, without waiting for the law on defense at the level of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, which is to be passed after the comprehensive elections. In Article 7 of the aforementioned Agreement, its signatories

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from the lines of Croatian and Bosniak Muslim people agreed that Federal Minister of Defense Vladimir Soljic and his deputy Hasan Cengic prepare a draft law on defense for the next session of the Federal Assembly. The next session started on 11 April, but there was no Draft Law on Defense on the agenda. Why is it not there, the members of the Assembly asked. However, they were given no answer. We tried to find the answer by asking the person who knows it, Federal Defense Minister M.S. Vladimir Soljic.

[Karacic] Mr. Soljic, why was there no draft law on defense, too, on the comprehensive agenda of the 13th session of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Constituent Assembly?

[Soljic] The law has not been entirely coordinated between the political representatives of the federal partners. There have been many stages of coordinating it. We missed only one step to the final draft law. When it seemed as if we had reached an agreement, new misunderstandings occurred. As is known, even earlier we had had different opinions about the supreme command of the army and the service in the army. Our proposal said that the army should be under the command of both the president and the vice president of the Federation, and the Bosniak Muslims think that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency should command the army. Our stand, regarding military service, is that everyone should choose in which component of the federal army one will serve. However, the other side had a different opinion.

[Karacic] Is it possible to find a compromise solution at all?

[Soljic] We have offered a compromise to the Bosniak Muslim side in the way that the army would be under the command of two men, a Croat and a Bosniak, chosen by their nations, as a supreme commander. However, the Bosniak Muslims do not agree with that. They did not want to agree with our second proposal, which has been positively assessed by the international mediators, too. That is easy to understand, because we have arguments for our stand. It is not even ethical to compel someone to serve his military service in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina if only yesterday his brother or some other closer relative was killed by that very Army. The more people do their military service in the component of the other nation, the greater the sign that the Federation and mutual trust between the federal partners is growing.

[Karacic] Why do the Croats find the solution that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency commands the Federal Army unacceptable?

[Soljic] Something like that is not in line with the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, neither is it in line with the Dayton agreement. Therefore, the law has been obstructed. When it has passed the whole procedure necessary, when the international mediators estimated Croatian stands as positive, and the Bosniak Muslim ones legally groundless, the Prime Minister of the Federation, Mr. Kapetanovic went to Brussels. Apart from the two aforementioned moot points, the Bosniak Muslims have found 14 new ones. It suffices merely to take a look at the composition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and one can understand why it would be unacceptable to let it command the federal army. For already six years a representative of the Bosniak Muslim nation has been at the head of that presidency. It is known that, according to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that office should have been taken over by a Croat already a long time ago. There are the representatives of the Serb nation in that presidency, and it is clear that they will never be able to command the army of the Serb republic. The Croatian representatives in that presidency have no support from the Croatian nation. One of them has been removed from office, then he himself returned to that really strange political body. After all, the representatives of that presidency cannot move freely in their own entity, let alone do anything serious. There is no Fikret Abdic in that presidency, again, although he won the majority of votes in the elections in 1992. So, the arguments are very strong and very clear why we cannot agree to this body commanding the federal army.

[Karacic] The Sarajevo agreement on the Federation envisages also the responsibility for those who made themselves accountable for the obligations from that agreement, who will not accomplish their tasks in time. There was no Law on Defense at the Federal Assembly session. Do you expect any sanctions?

[Soljic] I am afraid of nothing. I stand behind what I have done. I have informed the high commissioner of the United Nations for the establishment of the Federation, Michael Steiner, about everything. I also accept that each side separately is to be judged by each individual element that has not been fulfilled. The one who is found not to be working in line with the Agreement, should bear responsibility. In this case, the Croatian side has done everything it was supposed to do, while in the behavior of the other side there are many elements of a game, by which the whole process of the implementation of the Federation is being stretched out of sight.

[Karacic] While there is still no federal law on defense, in Sarajevo they started to distribute savings books to the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in which

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compensation for their participation in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being entered. It has leaked out to the public that this information was published by the Federal Ministry of Defense itself. What can you tell us about that?

[Soljic] The whole operation has been conducted without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and without the minister's knowledge. This only legalizes the existence of the two ministries of defense in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is contrary to both the Constitution of the Federation of the Croats and Bosniaks, and to the Dayton agreement. It is logical that those who have defended the country from the aggression should be given a certain material compensation. It is, however, absurd, that the nation that joined the Federation and whose territory makes 50 percent of its free territory, is not entitled to the same compensation. By the distribution of stocks, the soldiers from one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina are given an opportunity to buy a factory in Siroki Brijeg, for instance, which does not belong to them by any criteria. All this is being drawn under some other form. One would like to raise the question of the previous salaries of the members of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. During the war Bosnia-Herzegovina and its nations as the victims of the aggression were given material and financial help by its friends in the world. The Croatian Defense Council got none of it. The explanation was made public that members of the HVO were given pecuniary compensation during the Liberation War. However, such an explanation does not justify decisions that are otherwise politically very noxious.

[Karacic] Then, from what sources have the payments been made to the HVO members and what could be the consequences of this most recent decision?

[Soljic] The HVO members have been given monthly pecuniary compensation, but not from a common treasury rather from the resources of the homeland fund, that is, from the help given by the Croats from all over the world and from the budgetary incomes in the territory under the control of the HVO. Since there is no cash for the payment of the promised compensation for the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the sum of money entered into savings books has the character of a public debt, the only thing that is unclear is of what state. The decision has been made by the transitional bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they could only have put the debt down to the Republic, which is in the process of transformation into two entities. It is certain that the Serb Republic will not take over the obligations of the public debt toward the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, so that obligation would fall to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although its bodies have in no way participated in making those decisions. So, the obligations have been made, and nobody knows who guarantees their realization.

[Karacic] Regarding that, the General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council has issued information, signed by Chief of Staff General Zivko Budimir. What does this information request?

[Soljic] The HVO suggests that the most important representatives of the financial institutions of friendly countries make a survey of the income and distribution of all the financial resources that came in as help to Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in the territory under the control of the HVO, and in the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and based upon that to suggest the most adequate means of compensation to the member of the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the defense war. The General Staff of the HVO deems necessary, and I personally agree, that this decision should be discussed at the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because its implementation, as made, could shake the mutual trust that has just been created between the HVO members and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members, as well as both nations as a whole, and the way in which it is to be implemented has unforeseeable consequences for future generations. If, on the other hand, it is established that the only means of compensation is to issue savings books, then we request that the savings books should also be issued to HVO members and the members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the HR [Croatian Republic] of Herzeg-Bosnia.

[Passage omitted]

[Karacic] Over the last couple of days you have talked about the organization of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Ministry of Defense with the special delegation for issues of military stabilization on the Balkans. How is the ministry organized now?

I can freely say, that for the time being the ministry is not at all organized, because there is no defense law. However, the gentlemen with whom I have talked, James R. Locker, Michael B. Donley, and Karl H. Lowe, promised expert help through seminars and counselling in the organization of the defense system and determination of the legal regulations in that field after the model of the Western countries' defense systems. [passage omitted]

[Karacic] How satisfied are you with the implementation of the military part of the Dayton agreement, and

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with the current negotiations about the final territorial demarcation between the two entities?

[Soljic] The military part of the Dayton agreement has been entirely implemented on the ground. The IFOR [Implementation Force] officers have done their part of the job more than successfully. One must admit that it has all gone relatively smoothly, thanks to the fact that all three armies adjusted to them. As far as the negotiations about the demarcation are concerned, I can say that they started a long time ago, that they are very hard, and that the results are very meager so far. Namely, all three sides want to make up for all they lost in Dayton. All together, what is offered is a lot less than what is asked for. I expect that through these negotiations we will nevertheless remove some absurdities like the demarcation line going through a cemetery, a building, or an apartment.

[Karacic] What is the way out of all this entanglement and the future for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Soljic] Only God knows the answer to that question. The people from this area throughout history very rarely made decisions about the questions that were most important to them. Somebody else, in general, made decisions about their destiny in Versailles, and before that elsewhere. Now, the organization of our state is before us, partly the way we wanted to do it ourselves. The state has to be organized the way that all three nations accept it. We should draw experience from the victims we have had. As far as the Croatian people are concerned, everything is clear. We want equality with the others. We have the power, will, and knowledge to gain it.

B-H: Ganic, OSCE Delegation Discuss Election Preparations

AU2404190196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, B-H Presidency member and Federation vice president, today received an OSCE delegation headed by former Danish Prime Minister Uffe Elleman-Jensen.

The talks focused on the implementation of the Dayton agreement and conditions for a realistic political debate on all its aspects. Particular attention was devoted to progress in the election preparations and the chances for their successful realization. Human rights, the right of refugees and expelled persons to vote in their current place of residence, and [words indistinct] were stressed.

B-H: Poll Shows 41 Percent Doubt 'Free and Fair' Elections

AU2604110596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 5

[ONASA report: "Elections Will Not Be Fair and Free"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Apr—The elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be free and fair. This was stated by less than half of the respondents in an opinion poll conducted by an agency for researching public opinion.

The telephone poll involved 500 randomly selected respondents from Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla.

The poll showed that 41 percent of the respondents take the view that the election in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are supposed to be held in September this year, will not be free and fair; 25 percent take the view that the elections will be free; and 14 percent of the respondents think that free and fair elections are possible if all parties have free access to the media.

Eight percent of the respondents take the view that free and fair elections are impossible and that the ruling parties will be in a more favorable position.

B-H: 'Over 4,950' Bosniaks Register To Return to Stolac

AU2504191096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As B-H PRESS reports, some 1,640 families of Stolac Bosniaks with over 4,950 members have registered with the Stolac municipal authorities to return to their homes, which is in line with the agreement signed by the highest-ranking officials of the Federation and the representatives of the international community. The relevant authorities are being contacted daily by Stolac citizens currently abroad. At the moment the information about these people is being processed. In this connection, the relevant Stolac municipal authorities have sent a letter to Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president and vice president of the Federation respectively, to Carl Bildt's office, to the Croatian and U.S. Embassies in Sarajevo, and to the Ministry for Refugees, asking them to do all they can to meet the wishes of the expelled Stolac people. The above have also been given a list with information about the Bosniaks who want to return home.

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B-H: Bosnian TV: 50 'Missing' Bosnians Return Home

AU2504185296 Paris AFP in English 1834 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 25 (AFP)—Fifty Bosnian Moslems who went missing in the Serb-held town of Doboj earlier this week have returned to their homes in the Moslem-Croat Federation, Bosnian television said Friday.

State-controlled Bosnian television said Monday that the 50 Bosnian Moslems had gone missing in the north Bosnian town during a clash Sunday between Serbs and Moslems.

They returned home in small groups using back roads on Wednesday and Thursday nights, the television said.

B-H: Hand Grenades Thrown as Refugees Clash Near Tuzla

AU2504141596 Paris AFP in English 1402 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 25 (AFP)—Hand grenades were thrown as a crowd of Bosnian Moslem refugees clashed with Serb civilians near this northern Bosnian town Thursday morning, a US military official said here.

The official, who asked not to be named, said at least one hand grenade had been thrown and one Moslem had been "slightly injured" when the group of 250 Moslems clashed with around 150 Serbs on the outskirts of the village of Mahala.

The Moslems were seeking to return to their homes in the Serb-held village, a spokesman for the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) said in Sarajevo, confirming the incident.

IFOR spokesman Major Peter Bullock said there had been "two small explosions" when the two groups met outside Mahala at around 10:30 Thursday.

The groups also hurled stones at each other.

IFOR troops intervened and the incident was ended, Bullock said, adding he had no further details of the incident.

Under the Dayton peace treaty, signed last December, refugees have the right to return to their former homes. The campaign of ethnic cleansing which characterised the war forced more than 2.3 million people from their homes, making them refugees or internally displaced people.

Since last Friday a series of clashes have erupted between Moslems and Serbs across northern and central Bosnia.

Bullock said he was not aware of any shots being fired at Mahala on Thursday.

B-H: Hague Court Demands Sanctions Against Belgrade, Pale

AU2504142996 Paris AFP in English 1341 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Strasbourg, April 25 (AFP)—The chairman of the UN war crimes tribunal appealed Thursday [25 April] for sanctions against Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs over what he called their refusal to cooperate with Bosnia war crimes probe.

Antonio Cassese, who heads The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, said the international community should reactivate sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro, and against the Bosnian Serb entity within Bosnia, Republika Srpska.

"It is...of paramount importance that Mr. Carl Bildt, the High Representative for the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, consider triggering sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska, if no breakthrough occurs in the very near future," he said.

"Otherwise not only the Tribunal but the entire peace agreement will be shown to be a paper tiger, toothless and impotent," he added.

The tribunal has been struggling to investigate allegations of atrocities committed during Bosnia's almost four-year war, notably in areas of the former Yugoslav republic controlled by Bosnian Serbs.

Belgrade has also been accused of sheltering war crimes suspects wanted by the tribunal for questioning into alleged massacres of Moslem civilians.

The rump Yugoslavia, Cassese said, "has staunchly refused to execute any arrest warrant" issued by the court, and the Republika Srpska has failed to take any action against Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

"Not only are they (Karadzic and Mladic) enjoying total impunity; they continue to hold official positions, (which) they use to interfere with freedom of movement, as well as with the democratization and reconciliation process."

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Noting that authorities in the region place great importance on economic aid from Europe, Cassese urged European countries to "insist on the linkage between their support and full compliance by the parties concerned with the provisions of the peace agreement, including cooperation with the tribunal."

Fifty-one of the 57 people the tribunal has indicted remain at large, he said, adding that authorities in the former Yugoslavia have acted on none of the 120 arrest warrants the tribunal has issued.

"Without justice, peace is but a sandcastle to be washed away by the relentless tide of continuing ethnic hatred," Cassese said.

In a separate development Thursday, the war crimes tribunal held a public hearing into whether Croatian General Tihomir [Blaskic] should be provisionally released from custody.

Tihomir [Blaskic] was accused of taking part in a 1993 massacre of 100 civilian Moslems in Bosnia.

His defense lawyer, Zvonimir Hodak, said Tihomir [Blaskic] needed to attend to his wife, who had just been admitted to hospital.

"He would have come to The Hague earlier if he had not been awaiting the birth of his son," Hodak said.

Tihomir [Blaskic] had paid authorities in The Netherlands $127,000 to finance a detention site separate from the UN prison near The Hague, but the site was not yet ready, Hodak added.

The prosecution said that because Tihomir [Blaskic]'s site was not ready, he did not qualify for release.

The tribunal will make its decision at 5:00 p.m. (1500 GMT).

B-H: Djukic Vows 'To Prove His Innocence' of War Crimes

LD2504224196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2221 GMT 25 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 25 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Serb general whom The Hague-based war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia has provisionally released from custody because of deteriorated health announced on Thursday he intended to prove his innocence.

"My reputation must remain untarnished, because I have done nothing to deserve to be hauled before the international tribunal and, my state of health permitting, I shall return to see this trial through," General Djordje Djukic vowed.

Gen. Djukic's statement to this effect was read out to reporters at Belgrade airport on Thursday by his lawyer Milan Vujin.

Djukic, a logistic officer in the army of the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska, arrived in Belgrade in the afternoon from The Hague, where he had spent more than two months in the tribunal's detention.

The tribunal provisionally released him from custody on Wednesday, but has not dropped charges.

"We are satisfied with the decision up to a point," Vujin said.

The defence does not want the case against Djukic discontinued for health reasons and would like it to be resumed as soon as his health makes it possible, until a final verdict of acquittal has been reached, Vujin added.

He said that the defence had stressed in court that "Djukic was not brought to The Hague of his own free will, but was abducted and held and charged without a shred of evidence against him."

To this day, the prosecution has not submitted a single valid piece of evidence of Djukic's guilt, which is why we want the taint to be removed from his name, Vujin said.

He said that chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone had appealed against the decision of the judges who refused to consider the prosecutor's motion to drop charges against Djukic.

"Under the rules of procedure, the deadline for ruling on a motion is 90 days...and it would appear that this is a maneuver on the part of the prosecution to wriggle out of an obviously difficult situation," Vujin said.

"They have acted in haste, accused the general without evidence, held him in prison, and are now using his impaired health to get out from under," he added.

On arrival in Belgrade, Djukic was transferred to Belgrade's military academy hospital.

Dr Slobodan Ivanovic, who escorted Djukic from The Hague, said that improper treatment in prison had resulted in the sharp deterioration of the general's health.

Djukic, who suffers from cancer, was given salt- and fat-rich diet that is not proper in his condition, Ivanovic said.

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B-H: Exchange Committee Refuses To Release All POW's

AU2504175096 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Serb and Muslim exchange committees met at the IFOR [Implementation Force] checkpoint in Koprivna near Sanski Most today.

The Serb delegation proposed that all the prisoners be exchanged, but the Muslims did not agree to that, insisting on their proposal for occasional and gradual exchanges.

It was agreed today that the negotiations on these issues be continued next week.

B-H: UNHCR: Political Pressure Needed on Refugee Crisis

AU2504161296 Paris AFP in English 1446 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, April 25 (AFP)—A UN aid official Thursday, complaining that political leaders in Bosnia were stopping the return of refugees, urged stepped-up pressure on them to prevent a definitive partitioning of the country.

After failed attempts by refugee groups on all sides to return to their homes in recent days, the spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sarajevo said the return of refugees was being blocked by political authorities, most notably the Bosnian Serbs.

"There have been no returns so far...very little travel.... Unless there is a lot of more pressure, a lot of more effort by everyone, this will be a partitioned country," UNHCR spokesman Randolf Ryan said. [passage omitted]

Western diplomats and aid officials in Sarajevo agree that the central political authorities of Bosnia's Moslems, Croats and Serbs should force local authorities to allow refugees to return to their homes as required under the Dayton treaty.

But this contradicts the clear policy of some in Bosnia, including the Bosnian Croats but most notably the Bosnian Serbs, of ethnically dividing the country.

If local Serb mayors show some suppleness "they are hammered by Pale," the political centre of the Bosnian Serbs, Ryan said Thursday.

And a spokesman for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said the problem of ensuring the safe return of the more than 2.3 million displaced people and refugees from the Bosnian war was mainly a political one.

In an apparent reference to rebel Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock said one problem is that "the people who are actually running (part of) the country at the moment weren't (all) signatories to the agreement."

Karadzic, officially outlawed by Dayton, is still in practice in charge of the Serb entity in Bosnia, while Milosevic was the signatory for the Serbs in Dayton.

Referring to the signatories, Haselock said: "We have to try to pressurise them to accept their responsibilities."

"If the situation escalates, we may have to escalate in our response," he continued.

Ryan said there appeared to be "holes" in the Dayton peace treaty when it came to the return of refugees.

The job of IFOR is "nailed down" in Bosnia but "there is no nailed down plan," for refugees, just "a common approach for a way to deal with a very messy issue."

So far, however, the UNHCR has "not been able to do our job in terms of returning refugees," he said.

Speaking later, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, General John Shalikashvili, said the responsibility for the return of refugees belonged first and foremost" to all the parties to the agreement in Bosnia.

"It requires the will of all the parties to ensure freedom of movement...freedom of movement is not going to be guaranteed by IFOR soldiers."

B-H: RS's Krajisnik Rules Out Any Deals on Brcko Status

AU2504121696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by M. Kusmuk: "There Will Be No Haggling Over Brcko"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The position of Brcko, a town on the Sava in which more than 87,332 people lived before the war and which today houses about 35,000 people (out of which 2,000 are Muslims and Croats), determined its war fate—a solution for its status was, after Sarajevo, the most important issue in all the negotiations on separation from Lisbon to Dayton.

The Serbs are aware that there can be no statehood or territorial continuity of the Serbian state without Brcko, while, on the other hand, one of the strategic goals of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is access to the Brcko

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harbor and a link with Croatia. The Dayton accord—to be precise, Article 5 of Annex 2—stipulates that the sides bind themselves to arbitration on a part of the border between the entities, and not on the town of Brcko itself, as has recently been claimed. "The arbitration was agreed in Dayton at the last moment, it was sort of a mystery for all the participants in the talks, so logically there is a lot of ignorance now," Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Serb Republic [RS] Assembly, tells VESTI. "Our experts have worked out the ways in which the border issue should be resolved and it goes without saying that we cannot nor are we willing to give them this town."

Pursuant to the Dayton provisions, the RS government is supposed to appoint an arbitrator for Brcko by June. Speculation has it that Deputy Interior Minister Radomir Lukic is the most likely candidate. It is perfectly clear that the RS will not agree to the negotiations on the town of Brcko. Its leading politicians believe that the objection of raising this issue is to provoke instability and create political tensions between the east and the west of the RS.

A "loose" interpretation of the Dayton accord, favored by the representatives of the international community, is expected to generate panic in the part of the republic west of Brcko so that the RS will be absorbed in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation as quickly as possible. However, we will honor the Dayton accord strictly and we will not agree to the loose interpretation, Velimir Ostojic, president of the RS border commission, told VESTI.

B-H: IFOR Watches as Podrinje Serbs Block Bridge in North

AU2504152696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Report by Nadir Porobic from Orasje]

[FBIS Translated Text] It remains to be seen whether the agreements on the freedom of movement of the civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina are only a dead letter or whether it is just too early to implement them fully.

The latest developments in the presence of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Bosanska Posavina do not seem to testify to the much spoken about freedom of movement for civilians.

First, on Sunday two buses with Croats trying to visit cemeteries on territory under Serb control were stoned on the Bosanski Brod-Odzak road. Today, Podrinje Serbs used their bodies to block the bridge over the Bosna River toward Odzak, thus preventing dozens of civilians from the village of Garevac in the Modrica municipality from visiting their cemeteries.

Colonel Anderson and members of the IFOR just shrug their shoulders impotently at this, giving a sort of understandable explanation that more time is needed for everything.

B-H: Prijedor Serbs Ready To Stop Muslims' 'Violent Entry'

LD2604120496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1104 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prijedor, 26 April (SRNA)—The Prijedor municipal leadership today warned that there are indications that the Muslims are preparing a violent entry into the municipality, and even into the town of Prijedor itself, from Koprivna or Ostra Luka.

It is expected that the violent entry of Muslims into the town could come in the next few days, because a series of cultural and sporting events are being held to mark 30 April, the day of the municipality.

The Prijedor municipal authorities have announced that everything is in place to prevent the violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and it warns: "If IFOR [Implementation Force] is unable to prevent such an incident, the Serb people will prevent it."

B-H: Missing Serb Soldiers Reappear

LD2504173396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1255 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 25 Apr (SRNA)—Members of the Second Semberija Brigade who went missing after the fall of Mlinista, southwest of Sipovo, and were believed to have fallen into Croat hands in October 1995, reappeared in Bjeljina two days ago.

SRNA has learned that the two men from Semberija, after the retreat of their unit and not familiar with the lay of the land, got lost in the Mlinista area, where they begun their seven-month period of hiding and wandering about in the territory of the Muslim-Croat federation.

Those familiar with the problems of missing persons and POW's say that this example proves that estimates of the number of killed Serb soldiers are not entirely accurate.

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B-H: Comment on Karadzic's Objection to IFOR HQ in Banja Luka

AU2504165496 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 4

[Commentary by S.R.: "Run, IFOR Is Coming!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Radovan Karadzic (he is on the Hague list of war crimes suspects), president of the Serb Republic, has ordered an investigation into who allowed the Implementation Force [IFOR] to move its Northwest Divisional Headquarters to Banja Luka. The people's assembly of the Serb Republic in Pale had already decided that this could not be done. According to the Pale media, the decision for the British contingent to move from Gornji Vakuf to Banja Luka is of a strategic nature, it encroaches upon the sovereignty and integrity of their state, and it was not supposed to happen without their approval. According to information issued by IFOR, the headquarters should become operational by the end of April and, in addition to two British infantry battalions already stationed in the region, 300 more officers and men from several NATO member-states have arrived or will be arriving in Banja Luka. Karadzic's decision to hold an investigation into who allowed this has several causes and consequences, three of which are certainly of major importance. The first has to do with the constantly tense relations with IFOR, which have become increasingly apparent over the past month or month and a half. If you take a close look at the Dayton accord, it is clear even to a layman that Admiral Smith could have moved the headquarters from Gornji Vakuf to Banja Luka without anybody's approval, but.... Something needed to be said about it, and that is what counts.

The second reason for Karadzic's panic is the fear from the announced strengthening of IFOR's role in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the time when only two infantry battalions were stationed in Banja Luka, it was much easier for him to tour the Bosnian Krajina, which will not be so easy now, as the chiefs are arriving there. The pressure, exerted more by the international than the domestic public, on IFOR finally to arrest Karadzic if it encounters him will quite certainly keep the office of the Serb Republic's president in Banja Luka's presidential palace vacant for a while.

The third, and perhaps the most important, reason has to do with the domestic political scene, which is clear even from the news about this investigation: It has been undertaken against those who allowed IFOR to move to Banja Luka. It is difficult to say now whether the major target will be Predrag Radic, mayor of Banja Luka, (not on the Hague list, he is a member of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS]), who has been showing for quite a while a certain degree of independence from the Pale central authorities. Even so, he will not manage to avoid the investigation. The breakup between Banja Luka and Pale is neither a new, nor a strange thing, and is the best proof that a state cannot be built on myths. However, it is clear why the Pale leadership has taken action precisely now (finally?) to square accounts. Banja Luka is seen by many people as the link through which the Serb Republic will eventually return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This does not suit the Pale authorities and for that reason they are bent on installing their own people there. Information coming in from that entity is still all too scarce to enable us to forecast who those people might be or whether Pale will succeed at all in forcing Banja Luka to accept its interests. The fact is, however, that the strongest opposition to the SDS is found precisely in Banja Luka, so that Karadzic cannot risk entering the September elections with a disunited SDS. The attempt to introduce discipline in the party early this year obviously failed. And when a political success fails to come, the easiest way to deal with an opponent is to accuse him of collaboration with an outside enemy. Success is guaranteed.

B-H: Serb Commentary Criticizes U.S. Support for Federation

AU2504154696 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Apr 96

[Commentary by Zeljko Stojanovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] No more armed soldiers are seen in the Serb Republic, nor are there any weapons or ammunition on the ground. As far as we are concerned, the implementation of the Dayton accord can now enter a new stage. At this point, it would be wise to take a pause and look back.

Our government has consistently and on time fulfilled its obligations and has been fully cooperative toward European and world institutions, not paying much attention to what was happening in the Muslim-Croat part of the country. Not only have they failed to withdraw their troops and heavy weapons to army barracks—eight uncontrolled Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] tanks and an antiaircraft unit near Vares, of which the whole world is aware, are a case in point—but they are not thinking along the lines of demilitarization at all. The other day, Izetbegovic said over and over again that every citizen of the Muslim-Croat federation—he meant the Muslims, first of all—has a rifle. IFOR [Implementation Force], even if it wanted to, cannot keep an eye on all the Muslim weapons sent by different suppliers over the past four years that have arrived in great quantities in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla through various

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channels without any controls. The United States, for instance, cannot reveal and guard the Muslim weapons of U.S. origin, because that would be admitting that Washington had been secretly shipping military hardware to Izetbegovic's government, especially now that official Washington is trying to distance itself from illegal weapons shipments delivered to the Muslims in collusion with Iran when the international arms embargo was in effect.

One must find the answer to the following question: "Why are two contradictory processes going on simultaneously in the Muslim-Croat federation?" The European Parliament is demanding that the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims strictly adhere to the key point of the military part of the peace agreement, i.e., disarmament. NATO is trying to implement it while the United States, its leading member, is arming and training the Muslim army. Clinton's adviser (McLarry) has secured another $100 million for the job from three Islamic countries in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, we are demobilizing our soldiers, placing our heavy weapons under IFOR control, and accepting restrictions. There have been more than enough political anti-Serb perversions in this region, but the one likely to result from this could be the most dangerous of all. No lesson has been learned from the example of the Republic of Serb Krajina. It was forced to accept an agreement limiting the number of its troops and heavy weapons in the pink zones. Croatia had no such restrictions and the Croatian offensives Flash and Storm duly followed. But they were called Z-4, whereas this plan is called D+120.

B-H: Kasagic, Japanese Delegation Discuss Reconstruction Aid

LD2504171196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1202 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 25 Apr (SRNA)—Japan is to give reconstruction aid to the Serb Republic, leaving it up to our country to decide what to spend it on, Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said in Pale today.

Japan's policy is that the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation ought to be given equal treatment, Kasagic said, adding that future Serb Republic-Japan contacts will be carried out through the Japanese embassy in Vienna.

At his meeting with Takeshi Yagi, director of the Department for East and Central Europe of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kasagic spoke about the economic reconstruction of the Serb Republic and ways in which the aid money will be invested, laying an emphasis on the need for direct reconstruction aid to be given to the Serb Republic.

"We have explained that Bosnia-Herzegovina received $200 million worth of aid, which is of no benefit whatsoever to the Serb Republic," Kasagic said.

The Serb Republic prime minister insisted that Japan, as one of the donators, should determine the amount that will be given to the Serb Republic.

Takeshi Yagi, the head of the Japanese delegation, said after the meeting that, at a meeting of the Danube-basin countries 10 days ago, Tokyo had offered aid worth $130 million.

"The Japanese Government would like to help the Serb Republic. We spoke about the ways [words indistinct]" Yagi said, adding that this was "a very good beginning of cooperation" between the Serb Republic and Japan.

B-H: Germany To Increase Phone Lines to Serb Republic

AU2504123996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by "K.B.": "Too Few Lines for Two Countries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Numerous comments and complaints, made by our readers all over Germany that they are having great difficulties in making telephone calls to the area of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were our motives to go on a search for detailed explanations in the main office of the "Telekom AG" in Bonn, as well as of the Yugoslav PTT in Belgrade.

Those that we spoke to in both institutions confirmed that the situation is difficult, and that the small number of telephone lines is the main reason for the fact that it is basically impossible to reach telephone numbers in the Serb Republic from Germany.

However, it is necessary to first of all explain that, at the moment, connections with telephone subscribers in the Serb Republic are made exclusively through Yugoslavia. The territory of the Serb entity does not yet have a communication line with Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor can it use the existing telecommunications systems of this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. Gentz of the general head office of Telekom AG in Bonn told us that "at the moment, Germany has only 112 direct telephone lines to Yugoslavia. This is exceptionally few even for only normal telephone communications between Germany and Yugoslavia. According to the data available, citizens from the area of Yugoslavia who live in Germany are exceptionally

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heavy users of telephone services. They also make very many international telephone calls. Talks are coming to an end just now, and I believe that soon, within the coming month, the number of lines between Germany and Yugoslavia will be tripled."

To be more precise, 300 lines will be available, and it will be possible to make that many connections at the same time. However, according to what Mr. Gentz said, even the new number of lines will not be enough to normalize the communications completely. This is especially so if one keeps in mind the additional burden that exists because the lines to the area of the Serb Republic are also made through Yugoslav telephone exchanges.

[Box, p 7]

Sarajevo Seized a Satellite Station?

Mr. Gentz said: "Regarding the lines to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Telekom AG has installed a satellite station for telephone communications in Sarajevo which has the capacity of 60 simultaneous lines. Our basic condition was that the station was to be used for the entire area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, we are not capable of determining as to whether this equipment is being used for the entire area, and therefore also for the area under Serb control. We hope that it will soon be so, and even this piece of equipment will soon be quadrupled in capacity. This means it will be possible to make 240 connections at the same time."

In case of emergencies, we advise our readers to make telephone calls through the operator at the post office, and to ask for a connection with a certain telephone subscriber. The VESTI editorial staff has tried to make calls to certain places in the area of the Serb Republic in the past few days. The staff have mostly been successful in getting through to the desired subscriber in this "manual" way.

B-H: Vojvodina SPS Officials, Skender Vakuf Socialists Meet

AU2504145796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Report by Rade Brankov from Knezevo]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Socialist Party [SP] of the Serb Republic, supporters, representatives of other parties, and distinguished local citizens, today [words indistinct] and their party's activities.

These people are fated for peace, Simeon Kraljic, Municipal Council secretary of the SP of the Serb Republic, said in his address. We can only survive in the area in peace [words indistinct]. Our people have decided to stay in the area, on this land, and they did not fall prey to enemy propaganda whose goal was to make them flee the area. Not only have we stayed in our homes, but we have also received many who have come to the region, Municipal Council Vice President Petar Velusic stressed.

The Knezevo [Serb name for Skender Vakuf] Socialists were also greeted by guests from Serbia, Milenko Mandic, head of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] deputy caucus in the Vojvodina Assembly and president of the SPS Municipal Council in Becej, and Dusan Milicev, member of the SPS Vojvodina Municipal Council, who said:

The end of the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina marks the end of the toughest period in the history of the Serb people. [Words indistinct] conditions are being created for economic, social, cultural, and other progress. I convey to you the goodwill of the Becej and Zitiste business community, and I invite you to attend [words indistinct] Knezevo municipality and Becej and Zitiste municipalities. Let us become and remain masters on our own land.

Jovan Bausic, member of the SP of the Serb Republic Main Council, explained what the Socialists in the area expect. We are striving for cooperation with [words indistinct]. We are looking for competent people to implement the Dayton agreement to the letter. We distance ourselves from certain individuals in the ruling party who seem to (?lack intelligence). We have neither money nor power, but we are honest and have good people, Jovan Bausic told the Knezevo Socialists.

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Croatia: UNTAES Civilian Affairs Head Visits Beli Manastir

AU2504141396 Beli Manastir Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1820 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The head of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] civilian affairs for the Baranja area, [name indistinct], visited Beli Manastir today and discussed with the authorities some of the current issues concerning the international forces' mandate in the area.

Vaso Zigic, president of the executive council of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly, received [name indistinct], head of UNTAES civilian affairs for the Baranja area. They discussed several topics concerning relations between UNTAES and the civilian structures of the Beli Manastir municipality. Mr. [name indistinct] said a high degree of cooperation in exchanging opinions to solve practical problems was displayed during the meeting.

One of the topics of discussion at today's meeting was [word indistinct] during Gerard Fisher's recent visit to Baranja, when [word indistinct] economic program for the reconstruction and development of this area. The need was expressed for [word indistinct] of small-scale businessmen in Baranja.

[Begin UNTAES official recording in indistinct language with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] As you may know, there is an idea that loans should be approved to small businessmen, which would provide an incentive to small businesses, and it would be very interesting for us to hear the response of the people who are directly involved in small businesses. I think that this meeting [passage indistinct].

We also discussed the visit to [passage indistinct] [end recording].

Mr. [name indistinct] pointed out that such meetings were very important, since they [words indistinct] a new stage in the relations between UNTAES and the civilian authorities, which represents a chance for opinions to be exchanged and practical issues that are in our mutual interest be resolved.

Croatia: Eastern Slavonia Serbs Initiate Provincial Assembly

AU2504143296 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The provincial assembly held a session in Vukovar today. The assembly decided that the province, beginning today will be called the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem [Serb spelling of Srijem]. Some of the decisions of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem are that Borivoje Zivanovic from Beli Manastir was appointed president of the assembly, and Goran Hadzic's mandate as president of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem was verified. Borivoj Rkman prepared a report for Radio Belgrade Channel 1 on the session and its decisions:

[Rkman] As was expected, Goran Hadzic's mandate as president of the province was verified. Moreover, Borivoje Zivanovic, a representative from Beli Manastir, was elected president of the assembly, while Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic from Vukovar was elected executive council head.

Before the above were elected, a special assembly declaration was adopted. The declaration involves the change of the name of the Srem-Baranja province to the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. The declaration [word indistinct] the assembly's temporary character and states that it will remain legitimate until the next election in the province.

During his inauguration, Goran Hadzic stated that he firmly believes that war will not be resumed, while the new council head, Dr. Stanimirovic, announced that strict measures will be taken against crime and displacement, as will be measures for humanitarian care of the displaced persons in the province.

Since the assembly has been founded, there is no longer a need for the provincial council, which was sanctioned by a formal assembly decision.

Croatia: Beli Manastir Serb Official Views Assembly Session

AU2504140996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slobodan Milovac, president of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly, stated the following about today's session:

[Begin Milovac recording] After nearly a year in which the assembly did not meet, we have started to operate again, and I hope, I am sure, that the assembly will operate normally and without obstruction.

I think the assembly session went as if there had been no break, that the councillors were very understanding about it—naturally, there were some objections about the assembly not operating—but we finally all agreed, and political unity was achieved, as was the agreement on the existence in the area; we are unanimous about that: we must stay in the area, we must work and live here because this is where our future is. [sentence as heard] [end recording]

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Croatia: Police Clear 'Rebel' Remnants From Zrinska Gora

LD2504211496 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the orders of Internal Affairs Minister Ivan Jarnjak, the special police carried out a mop up of the entire area of Zrinska Gora [hills south of Petrinja on the border with northwest Bosnia] liberated during the army and police Operation Storm, clearing the remnants of rebel groups, military and technical equipment, and other equipment left by the enemy. Following the four-day action known as the Encirclement of Zrinska Gora, our team, led by Romela Globan has returned from the field.

[Begin recording] [Globan] The area of Zrinska Gora with its configuration and accessibility was favorable to members of enemy units during Operation Storm for storing material and technical equipment and it was through this area that most of the enemy forces retreated in the direction of Zrinska Gora, Dvor na Uni, and Bosanski Novi [on the Bosnian border]. This fact and the recent detection of terrorist remnants who did not manage to get away, and the fact that the reconstruction of destroyed villages and the return of residents was getting under way in the area, made it necessary to secure the area because this was not carried out at the end of Operation Storm due to the onset of winter.

[Colonel-General Mladen Markac, special adviser to the Ministry of Internal Affairs—identified by caption] With the detailed mopping up and search of Zrinska Gora we have established conclusively that there are no armed rebel splinter groups nor terrorist groups. We found some remaining mines and explosives and minefields. Their clearance is under way and we consider that people can freely and safely live in this area.

[Globan] [Passage omitted] The action was led by Col.-Gen. Markac with the help of Ante Soljic, head of combined special police headquarters. The action lasted four days and in that time 580 square meters were covered by 1,200 officers of the special police with significant support from officers of the Sisak-Moslavina Police Force. This detailed search established that there are no terrorist groups in the region but, in view of the proximity to the state border and River Una, on the other side of which are paramilitary forces of the [Bosnian] Serb units, it can be expected that there may be infiltration by terrorists, so that this action was also of a preventive nature. [end recording]

Croatia: Article Views Work of Beli Manastir Radio, TV

AU2604081596 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 8

[Article by B. Kostic: "Valuable Help of Radio-Television Serbia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In just a few years of existence and work, the television house of Beli Manastir has experienced many difficulties and challenges, most of which have been caused by technical and technological problems, as well as by a lack of skilled personnel. "Now it is functioning like a Swiss watch," Emil Leleta, a Radio-Television Beli Manastir executive, claims.

He assesses that the multiparty life in Baranja had a bad, even deleterious influence on professional work in this media house. Last year, Leleta claims, huge efforts were made to improve the situation in the house, and, since then, there have been quite harmonious relations among the staff, who are now concentrating predominantly on their work. Right now, television viewers and radio listeners have the chance to see and listen to real information, the basic goal of which is to keep the audience objectively informed, as well as to secure the survival of the Serbs in this region and preserve its multiethnic character in the whole of the Srem-Baranja region.

"Without valuable help extended by Radio-Television Serbia, and particularly its Novi Sad studio, we would hardly be able to perform this difficult, important and delicate work successfully," Laleta claims.

"I believe that we are producing a good, professional, and politically mature program that is well prepared and popular among our viewers," he points out.

The most significant part of the program of Beli Manastir Television are newscasts, particularly special ones, dealing with current problems regarding the life, work, and survival of people in the Srem-Baranja region. "Of course, we also have entertainment shows, and viewers are always quite impatient to watch the movie evening, when we show two movies in a row," Leleta says.

According to assessments by leading officials in this town in the Baranja region, the radio and the television of Beli Manastir are performing a delicate task, and quite successfully indeed, while aid coming from Serbia, and of course, the assistance of local municipal bodies that are aiding this media house financially, "are extremely valuable," Laleta says.

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The program of Beli Manastir television is broadcast every day save Sunday, while the radio program is broadcast every day, from 0800 to 2200.

Croatia: Zagreb Voices Concern About Renewal of War in Bosnia

AU2604081796 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Milenko Predragovic: "Muslims Write 'Graffiti'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two examples of Muslim "graffiti" upset official Zagreb this past weekend, to the extent of making it afraid! The renewal of war with the Muslims, at a time when the big powers have ordered the Croatian leadership to put aside their weapons, is becoming a reality and a nightmare that it is hard to escape from, despite guarantees from the United States.

This weekend, and the events that followed it, inspired Croatia to the utmost caution. The leader of the Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic [president of Bosnia-Herzegovina], spoke at the celebration of the Muslim Bosnian army [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] in Bihac. In front of several thousand of his followers, he clearly said that "the struggle will continue until Bosnia is unified and democratic." This threat was, in the first place, addressed to Zagreb, but also to the U.S. Administration, with a double message: The message of the Bosnian Muslims, and the Iranian message. Both imply a "unified Bosnia" with Muslim rule, without the presence of Americans. And without Americans Croatia will turn from being a "flying dragon" into an ordinary, harmless earthworm! Izetbegovic has his own calculations, since Iran has sent him large quantities of weapons and other military materiel, so that he is counting less and less on American promises. Besides, Iran has "smuggled in" somewhat more than 8,000 of its soldiers, who form three very strong brigades.

Zagreb understood Izetbegovic's message seriously, and now there is action in Washington, conducted through various lobbies, designed to induce U.S. President Bill Clinton to decide on supplying arms free to Croatia. This initiative started only a few hours after Izetbegovic's speech in Bihac. Of course, they are using somebody else's "impulses" for their own telephone: It is important for Croats to use the animosity between the United States and Iran to achieve something for themselves.

Beside this one, another piece of "graffiti" has recently appeared, only this time from Belgrade: The Belgrade mufti [Islamic religious official] Hamdija Jusufspahic, has been waving a red rag in front of the noses of mad Croats. He says: "By conviction I am a Yugoslav, and what goes on in Bosnia is a religious war, because they are all one people there!" In his words (in the paper SLOBODNA BOSNA), "pressures from abroad" are to blame for all the troubles and horrors in Bosnia. According to Jusufspahic, "the Croats saw their chance and the possibility of having fewer victims if they thrust the Muslims into a war against the Serbs!"

Yesterday the Croatian media were particularly embittered by Jusufspahic's statements about the restoration of Yugoslavia according to the formula—Croats in confederation with Croatia, and Bosnian Serbs with Serbia. The regime papers (VJESNIK in first place) remind their readers that "over 250,000 Muslims were killed in Bosnia," and yet the Belgrade mufti advocates the Serb side. However, Croatian journalists [as published] have forgotten one tiny detail: the Muslims suffered big losses in Bosnia, but their losses were significantly greater in the fighting with the Croats than with the Serbs.

The Zagreb media are also indignant about Mufti Jusufspahic because of his presence at the founding of the Yugoslav Left [JUL] and his hearty handshake with Slobodan Milosevic.

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FYROM: Stalemate Seen in Negotiations With Greece

AU2504171796 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "In One's Own Trap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The negotiations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece over their differences concerning the name are entering a phase of periodical routine meetings from which—regardless of the excitement that it demonstrates prior to every meeting—the Greek side cannot really expect anything in particular. "Same target, same distance," Macedonian Ambassador Ivan Tosevski commented upon his arrival from last week's fourth meeting in New York with Greek Ambassador Hristos Zaharakis and UN moderator Cyrus Vance. The "target," that is the goal, is to continue with the negotiations in order to prevent the differences over the name from further hampering the effective development of bilateral relations. On the other hand, the "distance" between the Macedonian and Greek positions in the interim remains as long as that between the Earth and the Moon. Macedonia cannot renounce its state name because the name of the state is also the name of the nation. Any change or "addendum" would mean depersonification of the nation. To this firm and real argument, the Greek side unceasingly presents only its "metaphysical" (as our foreign minister would say) exclusive claim to the name of Macedonia. Nevertheless, in the prior negotiations that led to the Interim Accord, and in the present discussions about the differences over the name, this "historical" argument was so much exposed that it has become more than clear that Athens does not mind so much the name itself as its ethnic component.

Aware that these extremely opposed positions cannot be easily solved, and considering that he does not have the mandate of an arbitrator, moderator Vance insists on the thesis that the "question is very sensitive," and therefore its resolution should not be rushed. Apparently "time is the best cure" is the center of this approach. This is why he stated last week to a group of Greek journalists that it "had never crossed his mind" to give up the mediation and return his mandate to the UN secretary general.

It would be unreal to believe that the Athens government is not aware of this development of the "question," and of its minimal chances for dragging itself out from a dispute that it itself has invented. Nevertheless, this is exactly the way it is acting. Greek diplomats are creating the rumor that the solution is to be "reached any moment now" in New York. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis asked Clinton in Washington about 10 days ago to "press" Macedonia to concede over the name. The Greek mass media are again creating the fiction that an alleged Vance plan for a compound name is being discussed in New York, which will also contain the name Macedonia, and that the Greek side "is ready to accept" but "is not ready to admit that it is accepting." In the meantime, Foreign Minister Theodoros Panghalos has changed his mind about the invitation he had previously conveyed to his Macedonian counterpart Ljubomir Frckovski to a meeting in Athens, postponing it to an indefinite date toward the end of July.

This confusion in the foreign-political meddling was created not so much by the lost battle (this is nothing new for Greece), but by the need to admit in front of themselves and to prepare domestic public opinion to accept this. Leading up to its congress in June, the ruling PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] has been definitely divided, concerning the "Macedonian question" as well, into those who believe that this has to be "landed" as soon as possible, and if not that it should be put on the shelf; while the other current is nationalistic and does not renounce its ambition to monopolize the name. The internal party's fire is ignited by the statements of the leaders of the opposition, as with the recent one by Milthiadis Evert, according to whom New Democracy, when it comes to power, will ask for a revision, that is, new negotiations on the Interim Accord with the Republic of Macedonia. Exposed to fierce criticism from the opposition, and because of its insufficiently resolute reply to the recent "Turkish provocation" in the Aegean, as well as because of his doubtful position due to the fast recovery of the untouchable party leader Andreas Papandreou, Simitis is obviously losing his mind. This is the only explanation for his appeal to Clinton to help him in the dispute with Macedonia, although he knows that Clinton is in the middle of his preelection campaign, and that in his foreign-political capital, based on the peace initiatives in the world's hotbeds of crisis (the Near East and the Balkans), only the normalization of Macedonian-Greek relations represents a successfully closed package [sentence as published]. Sources close to the White House say that the Clinton-Simitis discussions "referred little" to Macedonian-Greek relations, meaning that the U.S. President showed no interest in satisfying Greece's appeal. Why would he wish to reach for this dispute again and risk failure on the one hand, and a preelection radicalization of the expectations and attitude of the Greek lobby in the United States on the other?

Because of all this, Minister Frckovski's visit to Athens and his discussions with Panghalos are not "auspicious" at this moment. What else could the ministers discuss, being politicians, if not political questions that are

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burdening the relations of the two countries, as are the differences about the name, for which the Macedonian side is clearly and loudly saying that there will be no concessions?

This is why Panghalos postponed his invitation, probably hoping for more favorable times. These times, however, will not come by themselves. Greek political opinion will have to make—first of all out of its own interest—a serious effort to drag itself out of the name trap, the one that it set itself. Speculations by their mass media about Athens's alleged readiness to accept a compound name in which the word Macedonia would be contained unfortunately do not represent such an effort. On the contrary, they befog the truth that Greece practically accepted a "compound name" with the word Macedonia three years ago, when it sponsored the resolution on the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the United Nations under the known and now ill-timed reference.

FYROM: Albanian Parties React to Murder in Kosovo

AU2504201996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The killing of student Armend Daci has caused a deep indignation among the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The Albanian political parties, the Tetovo University, and other associations and organizations have also reacted against this criminal act. Here is a telephone report by Imer Ismajli from Skopje:

[Ismajli] The People's Democratic Party [NDP—PDP in Albanian] has issued a public communique considering the latest events in Kosova to be a provocation by indefinite forces that aim at escalating the tense situation in Kosova. All that is happening in Kosova, the communique further says, should serve the international community as a reminder and warning to be seriously and urgently engaged in justly resolving the Kosova issue, respectively the Albanian issue in their ethnic territories in the former Yugoslavia.

The Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP—PPD in Albanian] reacted in a similar way, drawing attention to the unforeseen consequences of an open conflict in Kosova. The PDP urgently demands that the international community not allow the Kosova issue to be resolved according to the Serbian bloody scenarios, but to respect the will of Albanians living in Kosova and their right to self-determination.

The Tetovo University management and rector also commented on the latest events in Kosova. In a public communique, the university draws stresses the international community should know that, without respecting the will of Albanians in Kosova, there will be no long-term peace not only in the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, but in the entire Balkan peninsula.

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Poland: Wlodzimierz Objects to European Parliament Resolution

LD2504201596 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1705 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 25 April—Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz sent a letter on 25 April to the president of the European Parliament, Klaus Haensch.

Here follows the text made available to PAP by the Government Information Center:

Dear Mr President,

I have studied closely the text of the resolution adopted on 18 April of this year by the European Parliament and relating to issues connected with the Auschwitz concentration camp.

I would like the position of the Polish Government on these issues to be crystal clear. In connection with this, let me remind you:

1. The Council of Ministers, after acquainting itself with the course and the circumstances of the demonstration organized in Auschwitz, expressed its strong disapproval for the violation of the dignity of the place of martyrdom and condemned slogans and actions bearing characteristics of racism, anti-Semitism, and intolerance.

The Council of Ministers noted that local authorities could not yield to blackmail from any organizations or individuals.

To prevent similar incidents in the future, the Polish Government will submit a bill amending the "Right to Assembly" act to tighten the existing provisions concerning assemblies and demonstrations at places of martyrdom.

The Council of Ministers has instructed the ministers of justice and internal affairs to present a report on the activities of extremist groups in Poland.

2. As a result of the firm position of the central Polish authorities, all work connected with the planned shopping and services center near the Auschwitz camp has been definitely stopped. The Polish Government has taken steps aimed at a comprehensive and legislative regulation of all issues concerning the preservation of the facilities and evidence of crimes committed by Nazi Germany in the grounds of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Camp. This applies also to the immediate surroundings of these places.

The reactions of Polish and world public opinion show how alive are the memories of the victims of Nazism and the Holocaust in Poland and the world.

3. At the same time, I noted with concern the formulations in the resolution that call on the Council and the Commissions, as well as the Joint Parliamentary Commission, to encourage in relations between the European Union and Poland the undertaking of initiatives strengthening the knowledge of the lessons of World War II in relation to racism, xenophobia,and anti-Semitism. I regard the proposal to remind the Polish public about these issues as difficult to comprehend. In World War II, Poland lost 6 million of its citizens, and it does not forget that this included 3 million Jews.

Identifying marginal and pitiful manifestations of xenophobia and anti-Semitism with the feelings of the whole Polish society is hurtful and unfair.

4. Poland resolutely supports all efforts aimed at fighting racism and anti-Semitism. The Polish Government will develop international cooperation in this field. We are prepared to support initiatives such as the proposal, expressed in the resolution, to create at Auschwitz-Birkenau a European Center, which on the basis of lasting values of European culture and the tragic experiences of the eras of nationalism and totalitarianism, would serve the fashioning of the attitudes of new generations in the spirit of tolerance and friendship between peoples.

Yours respectfully,

W. Cimoszewicz

Poland: Russia Refuses To Admit Convoy Headed for Chechnya

WS2604120496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by the Catholic News Agency "ML": "D.O.M. Halted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian authorities have not allowed a convoy of the D.O.M. Foundation for the Reconstruction of Love [Dzielo Odbudowy Milosci], which contained humanitarian aid for Chechnya, to pass through their territory. The convoy was to leave Poland on 26 April. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the foundation a copy of instructions for members of diplomatic missions and international organizations to limit visits to northern parts of the Caucasus. The D.O.M. Foundation gathered over 40 tonnes of articles, among them medicine, hygiene products, clothes, and food.

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Poland: Prime Minister Comments on German Talks

WS2504145996 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25 Apr 96 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Ewa Rosolak; place and date not given: "The Problems Are Minor"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Rosolak] As you were leaving for Germany, you announced that, if you had a chance in talks with President Herzog, Chancellor Kohl, and Bundestag Chairwoman Rita Suesmuth, you would discuss specific issues: dealing with traffic jams at border-crossing sites, the issue of cultural heritage, unequal status of Polish construction and installation companies in Germany... The last subject was not discussed. Why?

[Cimoszewicz] We did not raise this issue in direct talks, but we decided that, in the near future, the labor minister of both governments would hold a meeting to discuss the labor market and treatment of companies. [passage omitted]

[Rosolak] There are rumors that you looked upon this visit as a trip to present yourself. The visit was to confirm that this prime minister is independent. Are those rumors true or false?

[Cimoszewicz] Let us reject the element of self-presentation, although, judging by the importance of the Polish-German cooperation, Chancellor Kohl certainly is interested in knowing who he is dealing with. Now, as for me, I also wanted to talk—for the first time—with the chancellor. However, a more important thing was to confirm that this government is consistently continuing the foreign and economic policies that were carried out by the previous coalition cabinets. If we consider that a new government has been formed, we will agree that it is indispensable to repeat such declarations. I wanted to hold not only presentation talks, but also talks on the problems of Europe's international policy. Each such meeting, each little part of the dialogue is a step forward.

[Rosolak] You told German journalists that our entry into the EU and NATO is a foregone conclusion. Is Chancellor Kohl still such a firm advocate of Poland's integration into these structures?

[Cimoszewicz] Yes, definitely. In the case of the EU, this is beyond all doubt. In the case of NATO, this is also beyond doubt, even though Chancellor Kohl stresses the importance and gravity of an appropriately defined role of Russia in the European security system, which is in line with our way of thinking.

Already in my Sejm speech I pointed out that Russia must have a place in the future system of European security and in the talks on this system. I declared that Poland is willing to conduct such a dialogue with Russia. However, the problem of the role which Russia would like to play in the process of NATO expansion is an entirely different story. In Germany, I confirmed our stance that decisions on Poland's aspirations must and may be made only in Warsaw and in the capital cities of NATO member-states. Nowhere else, certainly not in Moscow.

[Rosolak] When you met with Ms. Rita Suesmuth, you discussed and evaluated the functioning of the Polish-German treaty. On Monday you also invited representatives of the Polonia community to review this subject. Will you also discuss this with the parliamentary opposition, particularly the Freedom Union?

[Cimoszewicz] I certainly will. Actually, my invitation is not needed in this case because there will be an opportunity to take a stand on this issue in the parliament, as well: Ms. Rita Suesmuth will visit Poland late in May, which will be a few weeks before the fifth anniversary of signing the treaty. Then, all of the parliamentary groups will have a chance to present their position in the parliament.

[Rosolak] You said that your talks in Germany were good, open, and direct. Could you say the same about the talks with all of the neighbors with whom you have met so far?

[Cimoszewicz] Yes, I could. The heads of the governments of the neighboring countries with whom I have spoken so far were equally open and direct. I am referring to Prime Minister Klaus, Prime Minister Horn, and Prime Minister Stankevicius, with whom I met recently. In the talks I have held so far, I did not find anything that might be a cause for concern or worry. However, in all of the cases, I encountered some minor, unresolved issues. Sometimes I even wonder why they have been unresolved for such a long time. I remember that my Hungarian partners were interested in the resolution of the problem of [finding] a building for the Hungarian Culture Institute in Warsaw. We, in turn, waited equally long for the Hungarian authorities to give one of the Polish churches in Budapest back to us. There is also a similar problem in the case of our German partners—the resolution of the problem of the plot of land where the German Embassy in Warsaw is to be built. These issues must be addressed as soon as possible... However, even what I have just said proves that the problems that arise in our relations are really minor.

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Poland: New Chief of Military Mission in Korea Profiled

WS2504135896 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Adam Stasinski: "Brigadier General Stanislaw Koziej To Head Polish Mission in Korea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The prime minister, in coordination with the ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, has appointed Brigadier General and Professor Doctor Habilitated Stanislaw Koziej head of the Polish mission under the Disengagement Observer Commission [Komisja Nadzorcza Panstw Neutralnych—KNPN] in Korea.*

Formerly, this function was performed by Brigadier General Krzysztof Owczarek, who in the spring of 1995, following a decision by the North Korean authorities, returned to Poland with other members of the mission after a three-year stay at Panmunjom. Despite this, our country has not ceased to be a member of the commission.

It will soon be 43 years since our soldiers, according to the Polish Government's resolution of 12 September 1953, began their UN-mandated service in the demilitarized zone. In total, since the beginning of the mission, our country has been represented by 1,061 persons, including 794 professional soldiers and 267 civil servants. Beginning this year, the formula of Poland's participation in the commission has been changed. The chief of our mission will not live in the zone along the demarcation line between the Korean states, but will visit it for meetings, while carrying out his service duties in his country. For this reason, Professor Koziej, who is the 31st general to assume the duties of chief of the Polish mission, will continue to carry out the function of director of the Defense System Department in the Ministry of National Defense. As early as this week, he is going to Seoul to take part, for the first time, in negotiations and work connected with the fulfillment of his tasks, which are specified in the protocols of former KNPN sessions.

Brigadier General Stanislaw Koziej (52) is a professor, doctor habilitated of the military sciences. He graduated from the Mechanized Troops Officers School and the Polish Army General Staff Academy, where he was a lecturer and chief of the Chair of Operational Art; subsequently, he was chief of the Defense Academy Ground Troops Department. In 1993, he begun working in the National Security Office, participating in the elaboration of a new military doctrine draft and a concept of structural changes in the Army. A year later, he was appointed director of the Defense System Department in the Ministry of National Defense. He is author of several books, including *The Theory of Military Art*, and several hundred publications in Polish and foreign editions. He is married and has two children.

Poland: SdRP Statement on Outcome of Oleksy Case

WS2504135696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Apr 96 p 3

["Statement of the Presidium of the Chief Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic," issued in Warsaw on 23 April]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The decision of the military prosecutor marks the end of a difficult stage in the public life of Poland. It also unveils the mechanism of a political provocation instigated against the democratic Polish state. Lech Walesa undertook an attempt at changing the balance of power established by the votes of millions of Poles. The plan failed. The fledgling Polish democracy effectively warded off the danger.

2. The plot against Jozef Oleksy is a disgrace for a part of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Polish secret services, which once again allowed themselves to be drawn into political stratagems. Extensive conclusions must be drawn from this fact. Solutions and mechanisms must be implemented to protect society from the reappearance of evil.

3. We wish to express our hope that, in line with the announcement made by Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, all of the circumstances under which unsubstantiated charges were leveled against the head of the Polish Government will be elucidated.

Conclusions have to be drawn, and the instigators and organizers of this provocation have to be called to account for their deeds, even in front of the State Tribunal.

We will not pass a verdict beforehand.

4. We support the initiative of presenting all of the materials related to this case to the citizens. Let the Poles see what charges were leveled against Jozef Oleksy and how.

The publication of these materials does not pose a threat to the Polish state. If it does threaten anyone, it is the instigators and organizers of the provocation.

5. We protest questioning the sovereign decision of an independent prosecutor. The Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] had announced it would observe legitimate decisions made by Constitutional state organs

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from the very start. Well aware of the risk and deeply convinced of Jozef Oleksy's innocence, we appointed him chairman of our party.

The questioning of the prosecutor's decision by a group of opposition politicians implies disrespect for the law and approval of practices in which backstage operations and not democratic verdicts are to be representative of the will of Polish society.

The SdRP is appealing to the board of public television to rebroadcast the full news conference given by Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz so that the public can hear the complete explication of the decision.

6. We are appealing to politicians, parties,. and organizations to cast away their emotions and vehemence. This issue does not have to divide us. It can unite us in respect for democracy and in a search for effective mechanisms for the functioning of the state.

Warsaw, 23 April 1996

Poland: ROP Boycotts SdRP, Alleges Oleksy Was Agent

WS2504141096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by "WZ": "The ROP Boycotts the SdRP; Parys Asks About Oleksy's Past"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Olszewski, chairman of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], appealed yesterday to all parties to boycott the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. ROP will not meet with SdRP politicians even on television. Olszewski said that the Military Prosecutor's Office decided to drop proceedings in the Oleksy case under pressure from the governing coalition and that the verdict is a political one. Strangely enough, the conclusion came on the first possible date, despite the fact that many doubts had still not been dispelled. ROP Deputy Chairman Jan Parys asked: "Have the Office of State Protection, the prosecutor's office, and the Sejm commission ever seen Oleksy's files in the archives of the Military Information Services [WSI]? Is it true that many years ago Oleksy was recruited to cooperate with the intelligence services of the Polish People's Republic (Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army) as an operational agent? Did he complete training for Warsaw Pact agents in 1970 with an 'excellent' mark?"

Parys said that, when he was defense minister in 1992, he saw "many" WSI files, among them Oleksy's. He even knows the code name under which he was trained for collaborating with the intelligence and in which building.

Poland: Parliament Passes Social Security Reform Project

WS2604115996 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(ara)": "Social Security Reform; Better in the 21st Century?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm passed the governmental social security reform project. The deputies voted yesterday on a motion put forth by the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] to reject the project. The motion was supported by 95 deputies (KPN, Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, Freedom Union, Union of Labor) with 131 against and 20 abstaining.

The social security reform provides not for current pensioners, but for people who are now between ages 30 and 40. The government supports a system of voluntary pension funds and gradually decreasing the premiums on the mandatory system.

Labor Minister Andrzej Baczkowski said that the government wants to reform the current system and lay foundations for pension funds. Jan Litynski (of the Freedom Union) reported that his party will shortly come forth with its own suggestions, providing for combining the social security reform with the privatization process. According to Marek Borowski (Democratic Left Alliance), the adoption of the social security project is no breakthrough. Janusz Piechocinski (Polish Peasant Party) claims that passing the project is merely the beginning of a more difficult process. "We are waiting for the government to submit a whole package of draft social security laws for discussion," said Piechocinski. He claims that the state budget will feel the positive effects of the reform only after the year 2000.

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Romania: Poll Suggests 35 Percent Favor Iliescu

AU2504125096 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Ana Maria Vintan: "Opinion Poll: Extremist Parties Are in the Process of Declining"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Urban and Regional Sociology Center recently issued the results of an opinion poll conducted on 3-10 April 1996, when 1,144 people over the age of 18 were interviewed at their homes.

We are reporting on the results of four questions: For the presidential elections, 35 percent of Romanians at this moment would vote for Ion Iliescu; 19 percent for Emil Constantinescu [leader of the Democratic Convention of Romania—CDR]; 15 percent for Petre Roman [president of the Democratic Party—PD] and the rest of the candidates (* adim [Tudor], Funar, Paunescu, Mohora, Campeanu, and others) are at around 3 percent. However, the number of undecided people is somewhat large at 19 percent.

In Parliament: According to the poll, 32 percent will vote for the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PSDR]; 27 percent for the CDR; 13 percent for the USD [Social Democratic Union], which comprises the PD and the PSDR; 6 percent for the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and the Greater Romania Party [PRM]; and the rest of the parties are below this threshold. The distribution of votes within the CDR favors the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD] (13 percent). The PNL [National Liberal Party] enjoys the support of 6 percent, while the PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention] of 1 percent.

For mayor, 17 percent would vote for a PDSR candidate, 16 percent for the CDR, 9 percent for the PD, and the other parties are between 4 and 1 percent.

Twenty percent of those asked would like an electoral threshold of 5 percent, 17 percent would like a 7-percent threshold, and 36 do not know.

Being unaware of who commissioned the poll, we have some reservations about its results. Nevertheless, we can see that the parties that are in the process of declining are the UDMR and the PUNR. However, we cannot conclude that Romanians are fed up with extremism, because the PRM's popularity is, unfortunately, rising. However, distinct personalities, such as Funar and Vadim, are luckily losing ground. Petre Roman is far above all expectations, while Ion Iliescu is in a stable position. The large number of undecided people is also noteworthy. It would have been interesting to know how many Romanians intend to appear at the ballots.

Romania: Spokesman Discusses Russia Treaty Issues

AU2504154896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidency spokesman Traian Chebeleu has announced that Romania has no intention of signing the Romanian-Russian basic political treaty in the near future. For this to happen, ways must be found to harmonize the positions of the two sides so that the documents can be finalized and signed. An summit agenda of the two heads of states also needs to be worked out.

In connection with the statement issued yesterday, in which CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] leader Emil Constantinescu asked for assurance that the treaty would not contain anything that might be used by Russia to oppose Romania's plans to join the Euro-Atlantic political and military structures, Traian Chebeleu reiterated the clear positions and consistent activity carried out by the president and the government for Romania's integration in these structures, as well as the decision not to recognize anybody's right to veto this political option.

The presidential spokesman also criticized the attempts that are being made to bring into the area of internal political confrontation an important issue that belongs to the country's foreign relations. He further rejected the accusation of a lack of transparency by the government regarding negotiations on the Romanian-Russian basic treaty. Negotiators will continue to discuss how to condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in the text of the treaty or in a separate declaration, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu also said, our correspondent Sorin Aman informed us.

Romania: Foreign Minister Seeks 'Compromise' on Russia Pact

AU2504174796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with representatives of parliamentary political groups took place at the ministry's headquarters today, within the framework of the dialogue with the political parties represented in Parliament. The participants examined the stage and prospects of finalizing the basic political treaty between Romania and the Russian Federation.

At the end of the meeting, head of Romanian diplomacy Teodor Melescanu said he was encouraged by the common conclusion reached on the particular importance of finalizing the bilateral political treaty with the Russian

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Federation for our country's adherence to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Regarding the still pending issue in the treaty, namely a compromise formula for the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Romanian foreign minister said that there is a suggestion for a statement condemning the pact from a moral viewpoint to be signed at the same time as the treaty. We did not discuss the legal value of that statement, because there is no intention that it should have legal effects, Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said.

Romania: Commentary Criticizes Officials After ERBD Meeting

AU2404180196 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 17 Apr 96 p 12

[Commentary by Liana Simion: "At the EBRD Meeting, Romania's Delegation Scored a 'Black Mark' on Our Image Abroad—Answers From Romanian Officials Were Confused and Incompetent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Romania was scheduled for "the presentation of the country" on Sunday, 14 April 1996, the day of the official opening of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD]. The session opened at 1000 local time at the National Palace of Culture in Sofia.

The interest of the potential foreign investors in the development of the Romanian economy was obvious; the seminar was attended by between 150 and 200 people. I also noticed many journalists wanting to report on "the performance of the Romanian delegation," compared with the previous annual EBRD meeting in London in 1995.

If last year our country's official delegation included some first-rank people, such as Nicolae Jantea, president of the Romanian Development Agency, Dan Dumitru Popescu, president of the Restructuring Agency, and Vlad Soare, deputy governor of the Romanian National Bank [BNR], this year Romania was represented in Sofia mainly by second-rank officials. Thus, the Ministry of Finance sent to the EBRD meeting a general director, Miss Maria Sultanoiu; the BNR was represented by Mr. Dumitru Ghica, director of the governor's office; while the Romanian Development Agency had "at the rostrum" two directors, Dana Gheorghe and Ilie Marinica. Only the National Institute for Economic Research had a "top" representative, academician Constantin Ionete, who is also a member of the BNR Administration Council. In Sofia, the opening statement by the Romanian delegation was flowing and coherent and made a good impression on the audience. The 40 minutes (out of 60) of official speeches succeeded in being far from boring. Unfortunately, at the "question-and-answer" session the Romanian officials lost all the previous prestige. Asked by a Hungarian journalist why the BNR withdrew some banks' dealer authorization and when this problem was going to be solved, "our people" started stammering and said the process of reissuing the authorization is continuing and... that was it. Another question asked by somebody in the hall referred to the requirements of social capital imposed by the BNR and the time granted to the current banks to "align" to the new regulations. Until the answer was "found"—social capital required by the BNR is now 25 billion lei and banks will align to this requirement by the end of 1998—the members of the "presidium" were consulting together in whispers for about five minutes.

The final blow for Romania's delegation was two answers requested by a Turkish businessman. This foreign investor wanted to find out why the regime of portfolio investment has not yet been regulated in Romania. Some time passed until the answer was found that the CNVM [expansion unknown] is in charge of this problem (false), that the BNR's authorization is required (correct), that the national currency, the leu, has only a current account convertibility (limited), and that it is not completely convertible (not even for capital account operations), something that our distinguished representatives at the EBRD meeting did not know.

The foreign investor also wanted to find out why the Romanian legal framework is marked by lack of coherence, why prices in Romania differ to the detriment of foreign citizens, for whom "to buy" the same services is much more expensive than for Romanians, and, ultimately, what is the real level of our country's hard currency reserves. It is hard to believe, but, none of the "presidium" members knew how to answer this question. All kinds of ways were tried to evade the answer: That the reserves are fluctuating owing to the exchange rate, that Romania will be joining capital markets, and so on. The Romanian journalists present in the hall were surprised because two weeks earlier, BNR Governor Mugur Isarescu emphatically said that "currently the hard currency reserves of our country administered by the BNR amount to about $500 million." The press reported this, but it seems that these high-ranking employees in the BNR and Finance Ministry either fail to read the press or forget certain public statements made by Romanian dignitaries. As though it were a curse, at the EBRD annual meetings, Romania manages to get compromised by the official delegates who do all that they can to annihilate the progress made on the path of reform, presenting their achievements in a language that frightens those potential foreign investors who attend this important international event. This year, the only ones who succeeded, to a certain extent, to save

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face were Miss Maria Sultanoiu from the Ministry of Finance and the academician, Constantin Ionete. Unfortunately, one or two swallows do not make a summer, not even in Sofia. We no longer mention the classic misinformation included in the documents placed at the guests' disposal. From the "Romania—Country Profile" folder we could find out that the 1996 trade deficit will be only $700 million. However, according to the chart entitled "Selected Economic Indicators" it turns out to be another deficit: Exports at $8.4 billion minus the $9.3 million imports would lead to a trade deficit of... $900 million!

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Slovenia: Delegation Pleased With U.S. Support in Debt Succession

AU2504154596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A Slovene financial delegation has returned from a several-day visit to the United States. Over the past few days it also held talks with the representatives of the U.S. State and Commerce Departments. The latter recently issued a special leaflet in which it firmly supports Slovene efforts for the settlement of the debts of the former Yugoslavia to foreign commercial banks. As is known, our country would pay 18 percent of the debt. Belgrade opposes an agreement with the creditors. Suzana Kos reports:

[Begin recording] [Kos] The U.S. Administration supports the efforts by the successors to the former Yugoslavia to regulate relations with foreign creditors and hails the Slovene agreement with the commercial banks, which will facilitate access to the international monetary market. Mojmir Mrak, chief negotiator in the talks with the foreign commercial banks, told us that this decisive U.S. support for Slovene efforts is not, however, the first:

[Mrak] The document that was issued now confirms this and gives a more comprehensive vision of the way in which the relations of the Yugoslav debtors—that is, the countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia—with the foreign creditors should be resolved.

[Kos] Because of our agreement with the creditors, the FRY pressed charges against the banks that supported the agreement and also against Slovenia itself, to which the lawsuit has not yet been officially handed. In the meantime, the price of the Yugoslav debt on the secondary market of capital rose again. The New York legal office that represented Yugoslavia broke off the representation. The reason for this lies supposedly in the assessment that the action will not be a successful one. Mojmir Mrak did not wish to comment on this.

[Mrak] It is indicative that, at the moment when the action started, those who had initiated stepped down from it. This could be a sort of pointer.

[Kos] Let us also add that the statement by the U.S. Finance Department among other things also stipulates that the creditors are studying ways of alleviating the debt burden on Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

Slovenia: Poll on EU Membership Conducted

96BA0251A Ljubljana SLOVENIA WEEKLY in English 23 Mar 96 pp 12-13

[Unattributed article: "Future in EU for Most Slovenes"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, 18 March—A large bulk of Slovenes (44 percent) believe that the future of Slovenia is closely connected with the European Union, and as many as 53 percent would vote for membership in the EU at the referendum, according to the public opinion poll, whose results were presented at a news conference in Ljubljana Monday.

The EU countries have conducted the Eurobarometer polls for over 20 years. In Slovenia, the poll, through which the European Commission wishes to analyze public attitude toward the Union, was introduced in 1992. The poll is coordinated by the market research agency Gral Marketing.

Slightly below one half of all Slovenes (44 percent) believe that the future of Slovenia is closely connected with the EU; 15 percent said it was the USA; 10 percent, other Western European countries; 9 percent, Germany and 4 percent, other Central European countries. The EU and the USA have strengthened their positions over the last year. Thirty five percent of the polled have a positive opinion of EU operations and intentions, which is 2 percent fewer than last year. Thirteen percent (7 percent last year) have a negative opinion.

If the referendum on entering the EU were held in Slovenia, 53 percent of those polled would vote for it, 14 percent against, while 17 percent are still undecided. Fewer people (44 percent) would vote for membership in NATO, 18 percent would vote against it, and 16 percent were undecided. An increasing number of Slovenes over last year believes cooperation with the EU would bring more benefits to Slovenia (19 percent; last year 16 percent); 30 percent believe the EU would benefit more and 37 percent that both partners would benefit equally. According to the poll, the private sector, education and the military would benefit the most, while agriculture would suffer the heaviest losses. As many as 62 percent are concerned over the fate of Slovene agriculture.

Asked whether Slovenia were going in the right direction, 45 percent of those polled said yes, the same as last year. Sixteen percent said their financial situation was better than last year; 46 percent said it was the same and 38 percent said they were worse off. According to their financial forecasts for the next year, Slovenes are fairly optimistic, as 34 percent believe it will improve, and 41 percent expect it to remain unchanged.

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It is interesting that fewer people than last year believe a market economy to be the correct orientation (40 percent down from 47 percent in 1995). Thirty six percent are satisfied with the level of democracy in Slovenia, while 60 percent are dissatisfied. Six percent fewer than last, but still 57 percent, believe that human rights in Slovenia are not respected sufficiently.

Slovenia: Opinions Polled on Parties, Government Achievements

AU2304132096 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 20 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene in its 20 April edition on pages 1 and 4 carries an approximately 1,000-word report signed by S.P. that summarizes the results of the paper's "extensive" public opinion poll conducted in more than 200 Slovene locations on 16 and 17 April by the paper's research agency Stik. As it is reported, the 1,837 people who took part in it where chosen to reflect the structure of the Slovene voters, and 30 percent of them did not have a telephone. The objective of the poll was to test political preferences at "the trial elections" and also gauge public opinion on topical issues and the politicians' popularity.

As S.P. writes, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) won the greatest number of votes in "the trial elections" among the 21 registered political parties—namely, 11.2 percent—which, as S.P. points out, "is considerably less than in the telephone polls. The Social Democrats and the United List won approximately the same number of votes as did the Democratic Party of Retirees [DeSUS] and some smaller parliamentary parties. The Christian Democrats and especially the National Party of Slovenia and the Greens of Slovenia won a little more, while the Slovene People's Party and the Democratic Party won a little less."

"On the other hand," the author continues, "the investigation on the field unfortunately confirmed the worrying trend of people turning away from the political parties and politics in general."

Results of 'Trial Elections'

	Percent
Liberal Party of Slovenia—LDS	11.2
Socialdemocratic Party of Slovenia—SDS	7.5
Slovene Christian Democrats—SKD	6.3
United List of Social Democrats—ZLSD	5.4
Slovene People's Party—SLS	5.0
Slovene National Party—SNS	3.8
Greens of Slovenia—Zeleni	3.6
Democratic Party of Retirees—DeSUS	1.7
Liberal Party—LS	1.4
Workers Party of Slovenia—DSS	1.0
Green Alternative—ZA	0.7
Party of the Independent—SN	0.6
Alliance for Primorska—ZZP	0.6
Slovene National Right—SND	0.5
Christian Social Union—KSU	0.4
Party of Equal Counties—SED	0.4
County Party for Stajerska—DSS	0.4
Slovene Craftsmen and Entrepreneurs' Party of the Center—SOPS	0.3
The Republican Alliance of Slovenia	0.1
The Alliance for Progress of Radece and Radece Region	0.1
None	15.5
I would not vote	11.6
I do not know	20.3

The poll also examined public opinion on the achievements of the current government coalition.

Assessment of Government Achievements

	Positive	Negative	Cannot Say
	Percent		
Highway construction	60.6	29.8	9.6
Country's defense	50.7	25.7	23.6
Drawing closer to the developed world	47.3	39.1	13.6
Affirmation of democratic principles	32.4	41.1	25.5
Relations with neighbors	32.2	54.6	13.2
Legal security	25.1	60.1	14.8

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	Positive	Negative	Cannot Say
Privatization	25.0	55.0	20.0
Crime prevention	24.0	65.8	10.2
Economic success	23.2	61.7	15.1
Social security	22.8	68.3	8.9
Employment	7.5	84.7	7.8
State spending	6.3	79.3	14.4

"The response to the currently topical issue of changes to the electoral system were to be expected, of course. Among the three possible models, the closest to the people is the one according to which the voters would choose deputies directly. Nearly half of those polled said that they would like such a model. One-fifth of those polled quoted the model according to which half of the deputies would be chosen directly and half would be chosen by the parties on the basis of the electoral outcome as most suitable. The proportional system, in which the number of deputies corresponds to the number of votes that an individual party won at the elections, seems appropriate to one-ninth of those polled, while one-fifth could not or refused to comment on the dilemma."

As reported, the poll also showed that, although 57.2 percent of the pollees believe that Slovenia should reject the European Union demand for changes to the property ownership legislation, 58.4 percent would approve these changes in conjunction with the passing of protective legislation that would restrict and control foreigners' access to the vital real estate.

The poll also investigated the popularity of Slovene politicians. It chose five Slovene politicians—Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, ZLSD President Janez Kocijancic, SDS President Janez Jansa, SKD President Lojze Peterle, and SLS President Marijan Podobnik—paired them in couples, and asked those polled to comment on which of the two they like more. The results, expressed in percentages in an accompanying table, show that Drnovsek is more popular than any of the other four men. He is followed by Podobnik, who has proven to be more popular than Jansa, Peterle, and Kocijancic. Jansa is more popular than Kocijancic and Peterle, and Kocijancic is more popular than Peterle, who, thus, came last.

"The poll has finally confirmed the general impression that the Slovene public does not approve of the excessive or even combative decisiveness of the Slovene politicians in the resolution of the internal political problems. The majority (55.9 percent) believe that these problems in Slovenia should be resolved through negotiations and talks, therefore, by compromises. A principled, decisive, and unyielding stance is supported by 37.1 percent of those polled."

Slovenia: Deputies Oppose Allowing Foreigners To Own Land

AU2304145696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 Apr 96

[Report on the State Chamber session in Ljubljana on 23 April by Vesna Burnik—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After a stormy debate that lasted for several hours, including the Friday session of the State Chamber, the deputies have rejected the proposal to include the provision on foreigners having the right to purchase real estate in Slovenia—that is, the so-called Spanish initiative—with a statement to the first reading of the law on real estate and other rights. They added a request that the government prepare protection legislation on the protection of land, biological habitats [biotop], and such. [passage omitted]

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Federal

FRY: Deputy Prime Minister To Coordinate IMF Negotiations

AU2604111996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Without Comment on Zebic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Dragoljub Avramovic refused to comment on the designation of Jovan Zebic, deputy prime minister in the Federal Government, as the coordinator of all activities regarding negotiations with the IMF and other international financial institutions.

"I do not know what Zebic's appointment means. You should ask them about it, because the issue is not clear to me," Avramovic told the BETA news agency. After the conclusion of the annual assembly of the Money Market, Avramovic told correspondents that it was not Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic who had demanded the printing of money, but others.

Serbia

Serbia: Daily Claims Milosevic Received Abdic in Belgrade

AU2604102696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Abdic Has Met With Milosevic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF reported yesterday that Fikret Abdic met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on 24 April.

DNEVNI TELEGRAF cites circles close to Fikret Abdic and stresses that he is "Belgrade regime's favorite at the forthcoming elections in the Muslim-Croat federation."

Fikret Abdic has recently founded the Democratic People's Community (DNZ) in Mostar, and intends to run in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia: Sandzak Muslims Talk With Danish Embassy Officials

LD2504195496 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A delegation of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, headed by chairman Dzemail Suljevic, visited the Danish Embassy in Belgrade on 24 April.

In the course of lengthy and constructive talks, the current political situation in Sandzak was discussed and the issues of vital importance for interests of Sandzak pointed out. These are: Resolving the issue of the status of Sandzak and the status of Bosniaks in Sandzak and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the definition of the status of Sandzak in the FRY constitution.

The well known views of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak were presented, such as that it is necessary to create preconditions for elections in the FRY, work on the return of the permanent OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission to Sandzak that would have a greater number of monitors and wider authority than the previous one, and the opening of the office of the Informative Center of the European Union in Novi Pazar. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: Prime Minister Meets Businessmen in New York

LD2504215596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2140 GMT 25 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington, April 25 (TANJUG)—Premier of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic arrived in New York Thursday to continue contacts with U.S. businessmen.

Premier Djukanovic is on the third day of his working visit to the United States. He visited previously Washington where he held separate talks in the International Monetary Fund with IMF Deputy Director Stanley Fisher and in the World Bank with central European department chief Lee Roberts.

Djukanovic met with executives from the Budweiser beer industry who are interested in investing in and buying a part of the shares of the Niksic beer industry. Niksic beer would be distributed by Budweiser, just as the Niksic beer industry would distribute Budweiser beer on its terrain.

Wednesday evening, Djukanovic met with the executives of the strongest U.S. aluminium company Kaiser, interested in buying a part of the shares of the aluminium complex in Podgorica.

Americans are ready to produce beer cans in cooperation with the Podgorica aluminium complex, and with the participation of the Niksic beer industry, or Budweiser who will be its share-holder.

Djukanovic met in Washington yesterday with a member of the U.S. National Security Council, Alexander Vershbow.

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Djukanovic and Vershbow talked about possibilities for a full normalization of relations with the United States, including the lifting of the 'external wall' of sanctions that is still burdening bilateral relations between the two countries.

Montenegro: Prime Minister Extends Visit for Further 'Contacts'

AU2604115096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Djukanovic in Demand as Conversation Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic has stated that his delegation will extend their visit to Washington by two days, because the interest among officials and potential business partners in meeting him is so great that all the contacts that the visitors from Podgorica would like to realize simply cannot be performed within the planned time span, FONET reports.

Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic successfully completed talks at a branch office of the World Bank that is financing private projects. At the talks, plans to improve the existing infrastructure in Montenegro were discussed, as well as some projects on the construction of new road communications, waterworks, railway communications and airports that were presented by the Montenegrin delegation.

At these talks, an inevitable topic was the blocked relations between the FRY and IMF, which, unless they are reestablished again, will prevent Serbia and Montenegro's admission to any of international monetary institutions.

Djukanovic has also expressed the hope that this crisis in Belgrade will be overcome soon, and in a way that will enable Yugoslavia, after it gives up its counterproductive stance regarding the succession to the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], to establish, without delay, relations with the world's leading financial institutions, despite the existence of the so-called outer wall, that is, international sanctions, which are still being kept in force against Serbia and Montenegro by the UN Security Council.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Student Union Calls For Tribute to Dead Albanian

AU2504190696 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Telephone report by Ramadan Mucolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Harshly condemning the criminal act of killing student Armend Daci, the Independent Union of the Prishtina University Students invited all Kosova citizens to turn off the lights for five minutes at 2100 on 26 April in a sign of protest against the killing of their colleague.

Meanwhile, unauthorized persons have distributed summons in Prishtina calling for homage to the lamented Armend Daci. The leading authorities of the university, the Medical Faculty, and the Independent Union of the students of this university are urging citizens to ignore the call to take to the streets, which has been distributed without notifying university management authorities, the Medical Faculty, or the students' union. These authorities invite students, teachers, citizens, and the large public in Kosova to pay tribute to the dead student Armend Daci only by switching off the lights at 2100.

The Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] Youth Forum addressed the public, inviting it to boycott this unidentified call. This association appeals to the Kosova youths to show vigilance and maturity and demands a larger activity and better organization by all Albanian political subjects so as not to leave room for unorganized and provocative acts that may further aggravate the tense situation in Kosova.

The LDK Youth Forum expresses the conviction that the school youth, students, and citizens in Kosova will not allow themselves to fall into various traps and provocations.

Kosovo: Albanian, Serb Comments on 'Tense Situation' Reviewed

AU2504201096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Albanian and international political parties and associations continue to comment on the latest events in Kosova. The common denominator of these comments is what behavior or acts might further escalate the tense situation. Shaban Arifaj reports more by telephone from Pristina:

[Arifaj] The latest killings in Kosova, which remain unsolved, have further raised tensions and stirred up

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speculation and political propaganda, which in no way contribute to a spirit of good understanding toward resolving the Kosova issue, declared Mehmet Hajrizi, member of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] and chief of the LDK Information Section, in a report for the Kosova Information Center.

Hajrizi added that the Serbian regime has taken advantage of these cases to blame and punish not only Albanians, but the peaceful Albanian movement as well. After demanding that the international community intervene energetically to reduce tension in Kosova, Mr. Hajrizi stressed that, being organized, the Albanian people of Kosova will know how to overcome this tense situation and preserve a peaceful political course toward freedom and independence.

The Parliamentary Party of Kosova [PPK] has issued a public communique regarding these events, which considers that such acts of violence, no matter where they may have originated, aim to escalate the tense situation in Kosova. This party expresses the opinion that the Serbs and Albanians are not in enmity with each other, but that the Serbian occupying power is against the peaceful movement of the Albanians of Kosova.

Ascertaining that these acts of violence have increased tensions, the PPK appeals to the citizens of the Republic of Kosova to show maturity, calmness, and tolerance, thus supporting the peaceful road toward resolving the Kosova issue.

The incidents in Kosova were also followed with concern by the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

After condemning these acts, which could have escalated into a conflict that was dangerous to peace in the Balkans and beyond, the Tetovo-based People's Democratic Party [NDP—PDP in Albanian] invited the international community to urgently commit themselves to a fair solution to the Kosova issue and the Albanian issue in the ethnic territories of the former Yugoslavia.

International media, such as Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, BBC, etc., are also paying special importance to the latest events in Kosova. [passage omitted]

In one of its commentaries the newspaper BUJKU of Prishtina analyzes these events in the light of the Serbian propaganda campaign to blame Albanians, with the aim of creating conflict situation in Kosova and justifying their violence.

The Serbian media controlled by the Belgrade regime today writes on the latest events in Kosova with some reserve.

The TANJUG news agency broadcasts reports of local party organizations of the Serbian Socialists, which blame Albanians. At the same time, it also broadcasts the LDK communique that invites citizens to restrain themselves to the maximum, thus blaming Serbian policy for these acts.

On the other hand, representatives of the Serbian opposition underline that the latest events in Kosova may lead to the escalation of conflicts with dangerous dimensions, and demand that a dialogue be expeditiously initiated to resolve the Kosova issue, for which the Albanians are ready.

Kosovo: Reports Cite 'Tense' Situation in Province

AU2504180596 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports from the Shtime commune today confirm a large-scale foray by the Serbian police repressors against the Albanian population under the pretext of allegedly finding the perpetrator who killed a Serbian policeman three nights ago.

Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] sources in Shtime report that 25 Albanian citizens have been arrested so far; they are being detained at the Serbian police station and in its yard. Brutal methods of violence are being perpetrated against the arrestees. The Serbian police obliged 12 Albanian citizens, with their hands tied, to go through the town in a procession until they reached the police station. It was reported that 15 citizens, three of them women, today were tied to the banisters in front of the police station, their faces turned to the sun.

Serbian police have blocked all the roads in Shtime and continue to apprehend and mistreat many citizens. In the meantime, special expeditions have been blocking the quarters at intervals of every two to three hours, raiding Albanian citizens and plundering their shops.

Shtime today resembles a town under permanent police siege.

The Kosova Information Center reports that after the killing of three Serbian citizens under mysterious circumstances, a tense situation continues to prevail in Decan. Although there are still no reports about the fate of 10 citizens who were arrested before, it is known that citizens and party activists have been recently arrested.

After a visit to the LDK branch in Decan to get acquainted with the current situation, the Serbian police arrested a journalist and a Dutch cameraman, together with the interpreter and other people accompanying him.

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According to a few reports, a tense situation prevails in Mitrovice and Ferizaj [Urosevac], where the police last night obliged all hotel owners to close early. Last night an unknown person provoked all the guests at a bar in Podujevo while two Serbian policemen sat there and made no attempt to intervene.

Facing this extremely repressive situation, the Albanian population is still making the utmost effort to refrain from falling into irrational actions that might precisely now spark an escalation of the situation, as has been warned by the LDK, other Albanians in Kosova, and Albanian President Dr. Sali Berisha.

Kosovo: Berisha Urges Albanians To Refrain From Violence

AU2504205396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 25 Apr 96

[Telephone report by Qani Mehmeti from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Even three days after the killing of five Serbs and the wounding of five other Serb citizens in Kosova, there is no exact information on who committed such acts or whether someone claimed responsibility for the attack. However, these killings, as yet unclarified, have raised tension to a great extent in Kosova and Serbian police repression against Albanians has escalated. These acts have become a source of speculation by Serbian political propaganda. [passage omitted]

A statement by the Coordinating Council of the Political Parties of Kosova, issued today, stresses that the council appeals to all citizens of the Republic of Kosova to restrain themselves in the face of the serious and delicate situation created and to avoid every possibility of misusing their understandable dissatisfaction as a pretext to further escalate the tense situation in Kosova. The statement adds that the [word indistinct] uncontrolled and unconstitutional ways of expressing the revolt do not contribute to overcoming the grave situation in Kosova; on the contrary, they may further aggravate it.

The statement by Albanian President Dr. Sali Berisha in particular was received with interest in Kosova. According to the Voice of America, Berisha accused Serbian ultranationalist circles of perpetrating the latest incidents in Kosova. Berisha invited the Albanians of Kosova to refrain from violence and malevolence.

Kosovo: LDK Official Blames Milosevic for 'Rising Tensions'

AU2604144096 Paris AFP in English 1414 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Serbia, April 26 (AFP)—The leader of Kosovo's main ethnic Albanian party on Friday blamed President Slobodan Milosevic for rising tensions in the Serbian province, as mourners prepared to commemorate the death of a student in weekend violence.

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were asked to turn out the lights Friday evening in memory of a student whose killing Sunday sparked a wave of violence across the region the next day, which left five Serbians dead.

The Albanian-majority province in southern Serbia is pressing for the restoration of autonomy abrogated by Belgrade six years ago.

Kosovo's main Albanian political party on Friday blamed Milosevic and his Socialist Party (SPS) for the sudden increase in ethnic tensions in the province.

"The anti-Albanian campaign being carried out by SPS organisations in Kosovo is aggravating an already tense situation and increases doubts about the real intentions of the perpetrators," said Hydajet Hyseni, vice president of the Democratic League [of Kosova—LDK].

Calling the situation explosive, Hyseni called for an "urgent diplomatic intervention" by the international community.

He warned the Albanian and Serb population to avoid being "caught in the trap of an inter-ethnic conflict."

A Serbian was arrested Sunday shortly after ethnic Albanian Armend Daci was shot dead.

Following the Serbian deaths the SPS accused Albanian separatists of "opting for terrorism," warning it said would stand in the way of peace in Kosovo.

A coordination committee of the principal Albanian political parties meeting in Pristina on Thursday warned that the problems in Kosovo "risked destabilising" the Balkans.

It condemned "all acts of violence," asking the ethnic Albanian population to stay calm and avoid "uncontrolled reactions that some people might use to provoke an escalation."

Observers said the meeting was a sign of the gravity of the situation in Kosovo, noting that the committee had not met in two years.

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However, all political parties and student organisations refused to claim responsibility for leaflets which called on the inhabitants of Pristina to gather on the spot where the Daci was shot Sunday.

Kosovo lost much of its autonomy to Serbia in 1989 following conflicts between ethnic Albanians and Serbian, with direct Serbian rule imposed in 1990. Belgrade has since managed to stifle any opposition.

Kosovo: Albanian Paper Criticizes Serbian Propaganda

AU2604124896 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 25 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by R. Rugova: "Transfer of Conflict to the South?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A communique by the Serbian Interior Ministry states that there were attacks on Serbian police forces and Serbian citizens in the vicinities of Peje [Pec], Decan, and Shtime [Stimlje] on the night of 21-22 April, in which five people were killed and five others were wounded.

The culprits are not mentioned, but the use of the word terrorists creates the impression among the Serbian public that these crimes were committed by Albanians. There is no doubt in the public mind about this. Why?

The Serbian public has been bombarded for the last 15 years on end with anti-Albanian propaganda, portraying this people in the blackest possible terms.

This powerful propaganda has so bamboozled the Serbian public that any shadow of doubt on this issue that might arise in anyone else's mind must be eliminated from the outset. Any truth that may subsequently emerge is of no importance either for this propaganda or for this public. Were Djordje Martinovic's injuries self-inflicted or not? Did that child in Prishtina burn himself playing with matches, or did Albanians set him on fire? Did the fire at the Peje Patriarchate residence start because of defective electrical wiring or carelessness of nuns, or was it started by Albanians? Did the Serbian old women dream that men speaking Albanian tried to rape them, or did they not? As far as the Serbian public and some of the media of the Serbian regime are concerned, professional duty, personal dignity, and the responsibility of following a story from its first report down to the very end are of no importance. It is enough to create the initial political effect. Thus this fatal propaganda dogs the defenseless Albanians down to the present day. It is not a matter of crimes proved in court.

On the other hand, the Albanian public is convinced that these same acts, whose culprits are never brought to trial and which are never even properly investigated, are enacted before the public by the secret, sinister agents of the Serbian regime and by Serbian paramilitaries or their supporters. Their aim is to create conflict in Kosova, to justify the Serbian state violence that is employed against Albanians, and to discredit the peaceful policy of the Albanians in the eyes of the world, which is supporting this policy to solve the deep problem of Kosova, now on an international level. This was the first comment that Albanians made when they heard the Radio Belgrade news yesterday morning about acts of terrorism and attacks on Serbian police forces in these places. The matter does not end here, but is involved with the degree to which Serbia and Montenegro have become emboldened after the elevation of their relations with several European countries to ambassadorial level, with the creation of situations of conflict at a time when the cause of the Albanians and Kosova is being advanced in European institutions, and with the tense situation in the Balkans. This may be the case, even if the incidents have nothing to do with what Vuk Draskovic said at the Serbian opposition rally in Novi Sad and the conflict between the Serbian opposition and the ruling party. On this occasion, the opposition leader blamed the current Serbian regime, which he said could not hold power without conflicts and war, which Milosevic now supposedly wants within Serbia. If there is anything in what Draskovic says, then why should this regime not transfer the conflict to Kosova?

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